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l)ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISPLAYING ETHICAL LEADERSHIP 
A BEHAVIORAL ETHICS APPROACH
Given the abundance of ethical scandals in businesses, sports, governments and religious
organizations, it should come as no surprise that social scientists have increasingly put
ethical leadership on the forefront of their research agenda. However, the literature on
ethical leadership has primarily taken a normative approach, suggesting what leaders should
do. This approach does not help in explaining why leaders sometimes deviate from such
moral standards. In fact, little empirical work has been conducted on the question of when
or why leaders actually engage in (un)ethical behavior (a behavioral ethics approach). 
The research presented in this dissertation aims to take a first step in filling this gap in
the literature by identifying and examining antecedents of several ethical leader behaviors. I
aim to answer important empirical questions such as: When do leaders go beyond their self-
interest? When do leaders treat their followers in a fair manner? And, do leaders consist -
ently take action against unethical followers, or do they sometimes condone unethical
follower behavior? In answering such questions, I will show that aspects of leaders
themselves (motives and dispositions), aspects of their followers (motives and actions)
and aspects of the environment in which leaders operate interact in determining whether
leaders engage in ethical leader behaviors or not.
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There ain’t no sin and there ain’t no virtue. There’s just stuff people do. 
 
Tom Joad  
(John Steinbeck - The Grapes of Wrath) 
 
 
 
 
 
When the one-ways collude  
with the map that you folded wrong,  
and the route you abandoned  
is always the path that you probably should be upon.  
When the bottle-cap ashtrays 
 and intimate's ears are all full  
with results of your breath,  
and the threads of your fear are unfurled with the tiniest pull.  
 
One more time, try.  
Stand with your hands in your pockets,  
and stare at the smudge on a newspaper sky,  
and ask it to rain  
a new name for everything. 
 
The Weakerthans – A New Name for Everything 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 2001, a shocking case of accounting fraud made Enron news headlines 
everywhere. Rather than an anomaly, the Enron scandal proved to be a catalyst. 
Indeed, ever since Enron, we have seen an abundance of additional ethical 
scandals in businesses, governments, sports and religious organizations. The 
consequences of these cases have been devastating. Several organizations went 
belly-up and many people lost their jobs, houses or life savings, some of them all 
at the same time. Naturally, people have become cynical about organizations, 
deeming business ethics an oxymoron or a contradiction in terms (Shaw, 2009). 
Organizational leaders are particularly scrutinized. They are held responsible, not 
only for committing unethical acts themselves, but also because of the important 
role they play in managing the (un)ethical conduct of other organizational 
members (Trevino & Brown, 2005). It appears that now, more than ever, there is a 
need for ethical leaders in organizations and society at large. 
 Given the number of ethical scandals and its consequences, it should come 
as no surprise that social scientists have increasingly put business ethics and 
ethical leadership on the forefront of their research agenda (for recent overviews, 
see Brown & Trevino, 2006; Trevino, Weaver & Reynolds, 2006). An 
overwhelming majority of the ethical leadership literature has taken a prescriptive 
or normative approach, suggesting what leaders should do. However, this 
approach does not help in explaining why leaders sometimes deviate from such 
moral standards (De Cremer, Van Dijk, & Pillutla, 2010). More recently, there has 
been a shift towards a more descriptive and predictive approach of ethical 
leadership (e.g., Brown, Trevino & Harrison, 2005; De Cremer, Tenbrunsel & Van 
Dijke, forthcoming). A central assumption in this so-called behavioral ethics 
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approach is that unethical behavior is not necessarily the result of bad apples (i.e., 
bad people doing bad things), but rather of bad barrels (i.e., situational and 
psychological factors; De Cremer et al., forthcoming). In other words, given the 
right circumstances, psychological processes can cause most people to engage in 
unethical behavior (Bazerman & Banaji, 2004). Thus, a behavioral ethics approach 
to studying ethical leadership should focus on what leaders actually do and on 
identifying the consequences and antecedents of leader’s actions (for recent 
overviews, see De Cremer, Mayer, Schminke, 2010; De Cremer, Van Dick, 
Tenbrunsel, Pillutla & Murnighan, 2011; De Cremer & Tenbrunsel, forthcoming; 
De Cremer et al., forthcoming). 
However, research that systematically examines the ethical dimension of 
leadership is still in its formative years and most of our knowledge comes from 
research on different, yet conceptually overlapping leadership styles such as 
transformational leadership (Bass & Avolio, 1994). Furthermore, research on 
ethical leadership, but also leadership research in general, has focused primarily on 
the consequences of leader behavior (e.g., Bommer, Rubin & Baldwin, 2004; 
Scott, Colquitt & Paddock, 2009). The importance of such research of course 
cannot be overstated, as it has given us a plethora of insights on how leaders 
influence subordinates, which leader behaviors are effective and which are 
counterproductive. Still, one highly relevant part of leadership research that 
seemingly has been neglected by scholars, is to examine and identify the 
antecedents of ethical leader behaviors. Put differently, little is known about when 
and why leaders engage in (un)ethical behavior and display ethical leadership 
behaviors. The purpose of the present dissertation is to address this gap in the 
literature by examining the antecedents and underlying motives of several leader 
behaviors that can be placed under the umbrella of ethical leadership.  
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1.1 WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT ETHICAL LEADERSHIP 
  
Ethical leadership has been defined as “the demonstration of normatively 
appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and 
the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way communication, 
reinforcement, and decision-making” (p. 120, Brown et al., 2005). It has been 
argued that an ethical leadership style directs employees towards goals and 
objectives which not only benefit the organization and its members, but also 
benefit other stakeholders and society (Kanungo, 2001). Most studies on ethical 
leadership related behaviors indeed find positive relationships with employee 
behaviors, perceptions and emotions. For instance, when employees perceive their 
leader to be fair and ethical, they perceive their leader as more effective (De 
Hoogh & Den Hartog, 2008). Likewise, they are more satisfied (Vitell & Davis, 
1990) and show more compliance with their leader (Tyler, 1997), as well as more 
commitment to their organization (Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith & Huo, 1997). 
Importantly, employees of ethical and fair leaders engage in less unethical 
behaviors (Trevino, Weaver, Gibson, & Toffler, 1999), more organizational 
citizenship behaviors (e.g., Niehoff & Moorman, 1993) and are more willing to 
report problems to management (i.e., whistleblowing; Weaver & Trevino, 1999). 
Clearly, ethical leaders play a crucial role in stimulating ethical behavior among 
employees. 
 
1.1.1 How ethical leaders make ethical followers 
 
 Leadership involves influence (Yukl, 2002), but how do ethical leaders 
influence their followers and provide them with ethical guidance? To answer this 
question, it is important to dig a little bit deeper in what actually characterizes 
ethical leaders. According to Trevino and her colleagues (2000, 2003), there are 
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two aspects to ethical leaders. First, they are moral persons, who are perceived as 
fair, honest, trustworthy and as principled decision-makers who care about people 
and the broader society. Second, ethical leaders are moral managers, who take 
proactive actions to influence the ethical behavior of their subordinates. Such 
actions for instance include communicating the importance of ethics and values, 
but also using rewards and discipline to hold subordinates accountable for their 
actions.   
 Two theories have been introduced to explain how, by acting in an ethical 
manner, leaders create ethical followers (Trevino & Brown, 2005). According to 
social learning theory (Bandura, 1977, 1986), people learn and imitate by 
observing the actions, attitudes and values of attractive and credible role models. 
Ethical leaders are such attractive role models, because they treat others in a fair, 
honest and caring way (Brown & Trevino, 2006), and this attractiveness is further 
enhanced by their power and status (Bandura, 1986). In addition, by practicing 
what they preach, ethical leaders are also perceived as credible role models 
(Brown & Trevino, 2006). Thus, for starters, leaders provide ethical guidance by 
being ethical role models.  
 In addition, subordinates learn through leader’s use of rewards and 
discipline. Rewards and punishments are highly social salient in organizations and 
employees will pay close attention to such disciplinary actions of the leader 
(Arvey & Jones, 1985; Kanfer, 1990; Trevino, 1992; Podsakoff, 1982). 
Consequently, when an unethical act is punished by a leader, this will send a clear 
message that such behavior is unacceptable to the punished employee, but also to 
other organizational members in the organization (Gini, 1998; Trevino et al., 
2003). Hence, through direct and through vicarious learning, employees learn what 
behavior is accepted and what is not in the organization, making it less likely that 
they will engage in unethical acts in the future. Taken together, social learning 
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theory suggests that leaders can provide ethical guidance to followers by being 
attractive, credible role models and by using timely rewards and discipline.  
In addition to social learning theory, social exchange theory (Blau, 1960; 
Gouldner, 1960; Homans, 1958) has also been introduced to explain how ethical 
leaders influence their followers (Trevino & Brown, 2005). Social exchange 
processes form an important part of interdependent relations between leaders and 
followers and in developing and maintaining trusting relations between these two 
parties (cf. Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard & Werner, 1998). The central idea is that 
followers follow the norm of reciprocity in social exchange relationships, leading 
them to voluntarily reciprocate rewards or benefits they have received from their 
leader. Importantly, these rewards from the leaders are not necessarily monetary, 
but can also entail for instance respect, gratitude or status (Avolio, 1999; Bass, 
1985). 
 A nice example of the workings of social exchange processes comes from 
research on fairness, which is an important part of ethical leadership (Brown et al., 
2005). Followers who feel that they are treated in a fair manner by their leader 
reciprocate by acting in a positive manner towards their supervisor and 
organization they work for.  For instance, they are more compliant (Lind & Tyler, 
1988) and display more cooperative employee behaviors such as organizational 
citizenship behavior (De Cremer & Van Knippenberg., 2002, 2003), and even 
increased in-role performance (Zapata-Phelan, Colquitt, Scott & Livingston, 
2009). In contrast, perceived unfairness can lead to detrimental consequences. 
Employees who feel unfairly treated have been found to engage in more 
counterproductive and unethical behaviors, such as retaliation, sabotage and 
aggression (e.g., Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001; Greenberg, 1993; Skarlicki & 
Folger, 1997). Thus, through social exchange processes, leaders can positively 
influence the actions of their followers by engaging in ethical leader behaviors 
such as fairness and negatively by engaging in unethical behaviors. 
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 Overall, theory and research suggests that by a) being an attractive and 
credible role model, b) by acting in a fair and caring manner, and c) by using 
rewards and punishments, leaders provide ethical guidance for their followers and 
positively influence ethical conduct in organizations (Trevino & Brown, 2005). 
Ethical leadership thus can (and should) play a crucial role in business and society. 
Indeed, ethical leadership is nowadays perceived as “the essence of effective 
leadership” (p. 6, Rhode, 2006). However, given the importance of ethical 
leadership, it is also important to understand what drives and motivates leaders to 
engage in ethical leader behaviors. 
 
1.2 AN “ACTOR” PERSPECTIVE TO ETHICAL LEADERSHIP 
 
 Leadership deals with influencing and directing followers towards a 
common goal (e.g., Chemers, 2000). Leadership is one of the most important 
issues in the social sciences and the literature on the topic is “enormous” (p. 182, 
Van Vugt, Hogan & Kaiser, 2008). A major part of this literature has dealt with 
identifying the dispositional, situational and behavioral factors that make leaders 
effective, giving us many insights in how leaders affect followers. In doing so, 
leadership research often has taken a receiver perspective, by examining how 
leaders’ actions cognitively, emotionally and behaviorally affect followers. A 
largely understudied part of leadership research remains the empirical examination 
of antecedents of leaders’ actions. Therefore, to gain a more complete and 
balanced understanding of leadership, it is also important to study leadership from 
an actor perspective (e.g., Bommer, Rubin & Baldwin, 2004; Scott, Colquitt & 
Paddock, 2009). Put differently, research should also address why and when 
leaders engage in effective and ineffective behaviors. In the case of ethical 
leadership, this means examining when leaders show ethical versus unethical 
behaviors. 
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 In this dissertation, I aim to identify and examine potential antecedents of 
ethical leadership. Due to the broad scope of the ethical leadership construct, I 
build the studies and conceptualize ethical leadership as having three important 
aspects through which leaders provide ethical guidance: by being a role model 
(Chapter 2), acting fairly (Chapter 3), and by taking proactive actions (i.e., 
punishments) against unethical followers (Chapters 4 & 5). Moreover, I build my 
studies around the social psychological notion that leadership concerns 
interactions between leaders, followers and their environment (e.g., Vroom & 
Jago, 2007). Specifically, I argue that aspects of the leaders themselves (leader 
motives and dispositions), aspects of their followers (follower needs, intentions 
and acts) and aspects of the environment (e.g., accountability) in which leaders 
operate, interact in determining whether leaders engage in ethical leader behaviors 
or not.  
 
1.3 OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT DISSERTATION 
 
1.3.1 PART I: When do leaders act as a rolemodel? (Chapter 2) 
 
 In the first part (and second chapter) of this dissertation, I will address the 
question of when leaders act as a role model. Specifically, I examine when leaders 
will go beyond their self-interest and show concern for others. Such self-sacrificial 
behavior to benefit the group or organization is important, because it contributes to 
leaders being perceived as attractive and credible role models by their followers 
(e.g., Choi & Mai-Dalton, 1998, 1999; Conger & Kanungo, 1987; De Cremer, 
2002; De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2002). Furthermore, self-sacrificial leaders 
elicit cooperation and trust among their followers and direct employees to the 
goals of the organization (De Cremer, 2006; Van Knippenberg & Van 
Knippenberg, 2005). Taken together, for leaders, self-sacrificial behavior can be 
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an effective way to model and stimulate positive and ethical behaviors among their 
followers. 
In Chapter 2, I propose that power and belonging are two important leader 
motives in determining whether leaders engage in self-sacrificial behavior. Both 
motives seem theoretically and practically relevant in relation to self-sacrifice. 
First of all, leaders are group members in the groups they lead and feeling included 
is one of the main concerns within groups (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995). 
Furthermore, research has shown that when they feel included, people are more 
willing to engage in cooperative, prosocial behaviors (e.g., De Cremer, 2002; 
Twenge et al., 2007). Building on such findings, I expect that leaders might be 
more willing to engage in self-sacrifice (i.e., risky and costly behavior that others 
benefit from) when they feel included rather than excluded.  
At the same time, leaders take an unique position in groups, because they 
control resources and make decisions that concern others (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & 
Anderson, 2003; Turner, 2005). Thus, experienced power also likely plays an 
important role in leader’s actions. However, the findings on the effects of 
experienced power (i.e., sense of power) are mixed, showing both positive and 
negative implications. So, how does subjective sense of power moderate the 
relationship between sense of belonging and leader self-sacrifice? Following 
recent studies that have shown that power makes leader more directed to the goals 
of the organization (e.g. Guinote, 2007; Overbeck & Park, 2006), I argue that 
sense of power might function as a substitute for sense of belonging. That is, 
leaders high in sense of power might already be motivated to self-sacrifice. In 
contrast, leaders low in sense of power are likely more affected by situational 
constraints (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2008).  The findings in Chapter 2 support this 
reasoning: leaders engage in more self-sacrificial behavior when they feel included 
but this is particularly the case for leaders who are low in sense of power. In 
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contrast, leaders high in sense of power self-sacrifice regardless of whether they 
feel included. 
 
1.3.2 PART II: When do leaders act in a fair manner? (Chapter 3)  
 
In the second part and third chapter of this dissertation, I focus on when 
leaders treat employees in a fair manner. Like self-sacrifice, acting fairly is 
important because it contributes to leaders being perceived as attractive and 
credible role models (Trevino & Brown, 2005). Furthermore, perceptions of 
fairness lead to support for and compliance with the leader (Lind & Tyler, 1988). 
Most importantly, fairness is seen as an important component of ethical leadership 
(Brown et al., 2005) and it has been found that fair leaders are perceived as being 
more ethical than unfair leaders (Trevino et al., 2000, 2003).  
Chapter 3 aims to answer the question of when leaders enact fair 
procedures. There is ample evidence for the importance of procedural fairness 
(i.e., the fairness of procedures used to allocate outcomes and make decisions; 
Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), as it provides many positive outcomes 
for organizations and society (see De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Greenberg & 
Colquitt, 2005; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002 for overviews). Such research has 
shown that followers care about fairness because it serves two important 
psychological needs. That is, a procedurally fair treatment by authorities is found 
to serve peoples need for control and need to belong (e.g., Cropanzano, Bobocel & 
Rupp, 2001). In Chapter 3, I take a reversed perspective on research that has 
identified these two needs, by examining whether leaders take these needs into 
account in their enactment of fair procedures. In line with past leadership research 
(e.g., Hollander, 1980, 1992), I argue that leaders are motivated to balance the 
needs of their followers with what is in the best interest for the organization. As a 
consequence, leaders might be willing to give control (i.e., grant voice) to 
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followers who desire this (i.e., have a high control need), but only to followers 
who leaders believe also have a strong desire to contribute and be a part of the 
organization (i.e., have a high need to belong). The findings in this chapter show 
that leaders in fact do so: they are more fair (i.e., grant more voice) when 
interacting with a follower with a high control and high belongingness need rather 
that when one or both of these needs were low. 
 
1.3.3 PART III: When do leader use punishments in regulating unethical 
follower acts? (Chapters 4 & 5) 
 
 In the third and final part of the dissertation, I will examine factors that 
influence whether leaders take proactive and disciplinary action when confronted 
with unethical followers. As discussed before, showing disapproval of and taking 
disciplinary actions against unethical followers is important because it 
communicates to all employees what behavior is accepted in organizations and 
what behavior is not. This arguably makes it less likely that followers and their co-
workers engage in similar unethical acts in the future (Chonko and Hunt, 1985). In 
contrast, when leaders condone unethical behavior among their followers, 
unethical behavior will likely prevail or even increase in the organization 
(Offerman, 2004). 
In Chapter 4, I focus on the issue of whether leaders show disapproval of 
unethical follower behavior (UFB) when they personally benefit from such 
follower behavior. In such situations, leaders face a conflict of interest between 
doing the morally right thing (i.e., show disapproval) and doing what is best for 
their personal interest (i.e., condoning UFB and profit from it). In Chapter 4, I 
examine whether holding leaders accountable (i.e., introducing the possibility that 
leaders have to justify their actions to others) motivates leaders to show 
disapproval of UFB. I predict and find that this effect of accountability is inhibited 
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when leaders personally benefit from UFB. Interestingly, I also find that followers 
correctly predict when leaders will condone UFB, which implies that followers 
might particularly engage in UFB in those situations in which they most likely can 
get away with it. 
 In Chapter 5, I go one step further by examining when leaders take actual 
disciplinary actions rather than showing disapproval when dealing with UFB. 
Following attribution theory, I argue that the cause of UFB might be an important 
determinant of leaders’ disciplinary use. That is, unethical behavior can be caused 
by a competence violation (e.g., a lack of understanding of the rules), but also by 
an integrity violation (e.g., intentionally for personal gain) of the follower. 
Research on these two dimensions has shown that, to observers, integrity 
violations are more diagnostic of ones character than competence violations 
(Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 1989). Hence, integrity 
violations might be weighed more strongly by leaders as they signal that their 
follower might engage in unethical behavior in the future. At the same time, 
leaders may vary in the extent to which they probe situations in terms of morality 
and the importance they assign to morality. Indeed, moral values will be more 
central to the identity of some leaders than others (i.e., moral identity; Aquino & 
Reed, 2002; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). Moreover, those leaders with a high 
moral identity are likely motivated to act in a manner consistent with their idea of 
being a moral person (cf. Aquino & Freeman, 2009; Blasi, 1983; Damon & Hart, 
1992; Hardy & Carlo, 2005). Therefore, I predict and find that leaders take harsher 
disciplinary actions against integrity violations compared to competence 
violations, but this is only the case for leaders with a strong moral identity. 
  
Overall, in this dissertation, I will present and discuss research in which I 
introduce and examine potential antecedents of ethical leadership. In the empirical 
Chapters 2 through 5, I will provide findings that show that aspects of the leaders 
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themselves (e.g., leader motives and individual characteristics), aspects of their 
followers (follower needs, intentions and acts) and aspects of the environment in 
which leaders operate (e.g., accountability), interact in determining whether 
leaders engage in ethical leader behaviors or not. Finally, Chapter 6 will provide a 
summary and discussion of the results, implications and suggestions for future 
research. 
 To conclude this introductory chapter, I would like to note that Chapters 2 
through 5 are submitted or published as separate manuscripts for publication. Each 
chapter can therefore be read independently of the other chapters. At the same 
time, the attentive reader might also notice similarities and overlap between the 
chapters in the dissertation.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
WHEN LEADERS SACRIFICE: THE EFFECTS OF SENSE OF 
POWER AND BELONGINGNESS ON LEADER SELF-SACRIFICE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Research on leadership has taught us that leaders who act as role models 
and contribute to the welfare of their group or collective motivate and inspire their 
subordinates to do so as well (Conger & Kanungo, 1998; Hogan & Kaiser, 2005; 
Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002). One effective way in which leaders motivate 
and inspire their followers is by going beyond their self-interest and taking on 
personal costs to benefit their group or organization (Conger & Kanungo, 1987; 
Shamir, House & Arthur, 1993). Indeed, leaders engaging in self-sacrificial 
behavior are considered more charismatic, effective, and legitimate by their 
followers than self-benefiting leaders (Choi & Mai-Dalton, 1999; De Cremer & 
Van Knippenberg, 2004; Van Knippenberg & Van Knippenberg, 2005; Yorges, 
Weiss & Strickland, 1999). Consequently, self-sacrificial leaders elicit more 
positive affect, trust, cooperation, and improved performance among their 
followers (De Cremer, 2006; Van Knippenberg & Van Knippenberg, 2005). 
However, despite the fact that self-sacrifice is clearly an important type of leader 
behavior, past research has failed to account for the antecedents of leader self-
sacrifice. In other words, an important question that the literature on leader self-
sacrifice to date has failed to address is what makes leaders actually engage in this 
influential type of behavior? 
Leader self-sacrifice has been defined as the abandonment or 
postponement of personal interests, privileges, or welfare in the division of labor, 
distribution of rewards, and exercise of power (Choi & Mai-Dalton, 1999). Such 
sacrifice can be partial or total and also temporary or permanent (Choi & Mai-
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Dalton, 1998). In the present research, we argue that leaders’ sense of 
belongingness (i.e., feeling socially included in their team) and a leaders’ sense of 
power (i.e., the belief that (s)he can influence others) are important antecedents of 
a leaders’ self-sacrifice. We derive these antecedents from the observation that a 
crucial characteristic of leaders is that they take a lateral (i.e., within) as well as a 
vertical (i.e., hierarchical) position in the groups they lead (cf. Van Vugt, Hogan & 
Kaiser, 2008). As such, these two antecedents are relevant from a theoretical as 
well as a practical point of view, because leaders are at the same time (a) group 
members who are susceptible to the same concerns as other group members are, 
perhaps most importantly the concern of feeling included (De Cremer, Van Dijke, 
Brebels & Hoogervorst, 2008; Van Dijke & De Cremer, 2010; Van Knippenberg 
& Hogg, 2003), and (b) unique persons, as they are able to exert disproportionate 
influence and power over other members of the social collective (Keltner, 
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Turner, 2005).  
Following recent insights from both the belongingness and power 
literatures, we argue that leaders who experience a high sense of belongingness 
feel more alignment with the interests of their group or team and will be more 
motivated to take on personal costs to benefit their group (i.e. self-sacrifice) than 
leaders with a low sense of belongingness. Furthermore, we advance the 
hypothesis that leaders’ sense of power interacts with their sense of belongingness 
because leaders with a high sense of power are likely to be motivated to engage in 
behaviors that contribute to their group or organization, regardless of their level of 
belongingness. More specifically, in the present paper, we aim to test the idea that 
feeling powerful substitutes for (and thus interacts with) feeling included in the 
sense that when leaders feel either powerful or included (or both), they are 
expected to be motivated to engage in self-sacrificial behavior.  
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2.1.1 Leader self-sacrifice and sense of belongingness 
 
 Arguably the most important human concern within groups and 
organizations is experiencing a sense of belongingness (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995; De Cremer & Blader, 2006; Hornsey & Jetten, 2004; Thau, Aquino & 
Poortvliet, 2007). Indeed, people are attuned to how others socially evaluate them 
and when people feel that they belong to a group they are likely to display positive 
behavior towards this group (De Cremer, 2002; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; 
Patrick, Knee, Canavello & Lonsbary, 2007). This positive behavior appears to be 
driven by social exchange processes: people who feel included believe that 
positive behavior will be returned in the long term, whereas people who feel 
excluded are afraid they will be taken advantage of (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, 
Ciarocco & Bartels, 2007). Because leaders are group members who are especially 
subject to the social evaluations of their followers (Hallet, Harger & Eder, 2009; 
cf. Meindl, 1995), they are likely to care about feeling included in the group they 
lead. Consequently, it stands to reason that their willingness to engage in self-
sacrifice, which is a unique behavior to promote group welfare as it entails 
personal costs or risks, will be influenced by the extent to which they feel 
included. Thus, when group members act in ways that indicate acceptance of their 
leader, this leader should feel more alignment with the interests of his/her group 
and be more motivated to take on personal costs or risk to promote the interests of 
the group and its members. 
Several studies provide evidence for a strong correlation between feeling 
socially accepted and acting in a prosocial manner (e.g., Parkhurst & Asher, 1992; 
Schonert-Reichl, 1999). Twenge et al. (2007) for instance showed in a series of 
experimental studies that people who feel excluded (i.e., operationalized as being 
predicted a lonely future or being rejected by their peers) consequentially act less 
prosocially, by being less cooperative in a mixed-motive game or donating less to 
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a worthy cause. It is important to note, however, that the behaviors measured in 
these past studies were usually not directed at the target(s) of social inclusion or 
exclusion and that these studies thus only provide indirect support for the idea that 
social inclusion elicits self-sacrificing behavior towards the source of the inclusion 
(i.e., fellow group members). In fact, we know of only one study that focused on 
behavior that is directed at the target of social inclusion, by showing that people 
who feel included in their group contribute more to a public good than people who 
feel socially excluded (De Cremer, 2002). Furthermore, prior work usually did not 
focus on prosocial acts that can be regarded as self-sacrificial behavior (i.e., 
behavior that is costly and/or risky). Despite these limitations, these studies do 
suggest that social inclusion or exclusion affects people’s willingness to engage in 
behaviors that can benefit the greater good.  
Although prior research did not apply these insights on the effects of 
social inclusion on prosocial behaviors to leaders in general or to self-sacrificial 
behavior in organizations (i.e., leader behaviors that are risky and costly), it 
follows that social information communicating a sense of belongingness should 
also affect group members, including those in leader positions (Bradford, 1976). 
Therefore, we expect that leader self-sacrifice is more likely to emerge if the 
others in the group (i.e., followers) communicate information that indicates social 
acceptance of the leader rather than social rejection.  
However, it is also necessary to point out that a leader’s self-sacrifice may 
not only be facilitated by leaders’ perceptions of how they are evaluated socially 
by others in the group. Specifically, leaders who feel powerful might also be 
motivated to engage in behaviors that benefit the organization, such as self-
sacrifice. Moreover, feeling powerful and feeling included may substitute for (and 
thus interact with) each other in the sense that when either one or both are high, 
leaders can be expected to be motivated to engage in self-sacrificial behavior. 
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Below, following recent insights from the power literature, we develop this 
argument.  
 
2.1.2 Sense of power as a substitute for sense of belongingness  
 
Although leaders generally have more power than employees at lower 
levels, leaders vary in how powerful they perceive themselves to be (cf. Anderson 
& Berdahl, 2002; Magee, Gruenfeld, Keltner & Galinsky, 2005). In other words, 
some leaders will have a higher subjective sense of power than others. The 
extensive amount of research and literature on the subject has shown that power 
affects behavior, perception, attention and other domains of human life (e.g. see 
Guinote, 2007a; Keltner et al., 2003 for overviews). Traditionally, research has 
often focused on the potential corrupting influence of power. Examples include, 
but are not limited to inflated self-perception (Georgesen & Harris, 1998), 
increased stereotyping (Fiske, 1993) and proneness to sexual harassment (Bargh, 
Raymond, Pryor & Strack, 1995). Conversely, other work has suggested that 
power promotes selfless behavior and thus leads people to contribute more to the 
organization (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Willer, 2009).  
Recent work shows that power should in itself not be considered as a 
variable that makes people behave in selfish or cooperative ways, but that it 
improves people’s capacity to respond to the goals in the situation (e.g., Galinsky, 
Gruenfeld & Magee, 2003; Overbeck & Park, 2006; Guinote, 2008). Powerful 
individuals have thus been shown to be more goal-oriented (e.g. Guinote, 2007b; 
Overbeck & Park, 2006), and this, dependent on the goals present in the situation, 
makes powerful people act more selfish or more prosocially than less powerful 
people (Galinsky et al., 2003). In the present study we follow these recent insights 
in the power literature and propose that feeling powerful (i.e., having a high sense 
of power) facilitates positive leadership behaviors such as self-sacrifice because a 
On The Psychology of Displaying Ethical Leadership 
 
                                                                                                                 
18 
 
high sense of power facilitates a focus and motivation to act in ways that serve the 
interests and contribute to the group or organization (Overbeck & Park, 2001, 
2006), which can be seen as an indispensable part of the leader role (Hogan & 
Kaiser, 2005).  
Furthermore, because of this focus on the goals of the collective, leaders 
with a high sense of power disregard information that is less directly related to 
these goals (Guinote, 2007c). This implies that leader’s sense of belongingness 
will matter less to those leaders who feel powerful when the opportunity arises to 
engage in self-sacrificial behavior. Leaders with a low sense of power, on the other 
hand, who are less effective in focusing on the organization’s goals (Overbeck & 
Park, 2006) and are thus affected more by information that is less relevant to 
achieve these goals, can be expected to focus on belongingness information to 
determine whether they will engage in risky and/or costly behaviors for the benefit 
of the group. In other words, we predict that a high sense of power can substitute 
for a high sense of belongingness in leaders, because leaders will engage in self-
sacrifice when they either have a high sense of power or a high sense of 
belongingness, or both. 
Some recent research findings in the power literature provide supportive 
evidence for the idea that leaders’ sense of power might act as a substitute for the 
effect of leaders’ sense of belongingness on leaders’ self-sacrifice. As noted, 
individuals high in sense of power have been shown to engage in more goal-
directed behavior (Chen, Lee-Chai & Bargh, 2001; Guinote; 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; 
Smith & Trope, 2006; Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & Van Dijk, 2008), and this 
includes doing the task that one’s role requires one to do (Overbeck & Park, 2006) 
and contributing to the collective (Galinsky et al., 2003). Indeed, those with a high 
sense of power can be seen as dealing more with the instrumentally oriented 
aspects of one’s position (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee & Galinsky, 2008) and in doing 
so are better in resisting situational influences (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, 
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Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008; Overbeck, Tiedens & Brion, 2006). Overall, those 
with a high sense of power can thus be seen as focusing more on the bigger picture 
(Smith & Trope, 2006) and dealing more with the role requirements of one’s 
position (Overbeck & Park, 2006). Therefore, when given the opportunity, leaders 
with a high sense of power are expected to engage in behaviors that serve their 
group’s or organization’s welfare, such as self-sacrifice, regardless of the situation 
(i.e., their belongingness to the group). In contrast, those individuals low in sense 
of power are found to be more sensitive to evaluations and external constraints 
(Fiske, 1993; Steele & Aronson, 1995) and more affected by social pressures 
(Galinsky et al., 2008) and information that is less relevant to achieving the 
organization’s goals (Guinote, 2007c; Overbeck & Park, 2006). This would imply 
that leaders with a low sense of power should be particularly affected by 
information about their belongingness in the group.  
Taken together, our review of the literature suggests that those leaders 
with a high sense of power are likely to engage in behaviors that serve the 
organization’s interest, such as self-sacrificial behavior. Following this reasoning, 
sense of power could act as a substitute of the facilitating effect of sense of 
belongingness on the willingness to engage in self-sacrifice. In other words, 
leaders who have a high sense of power, contrary to leaders with a low sense of 
power, might not need a strong sense of belongingness to engage in self-sacrificial 
behavior.  
 Building on these insights we formulate the hypothesis that sense of 
belongingness and sense of power will interact in predicting leader self-sacrifice. 
When leaders are low in sense of power, there will be a positive relation between 
sense of belongingness and leader self-sacrifice, whereas this relationship will be 
attenuated when leaders are high in sense of power.  
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2.1.3 The present research 
 
We examined our hypotheses in three studies. The purpose of Study 2.1 
was to provide evidence for causality, by testing in a laboratory experiment 
whether a leader’s sense of belongingness positively affects a leader’s self-
sacrifice and whether sense of power acts as a substitute for this facilitating effect 
on leader self-sacrifice. Subsequently, we further explored our predictions in 
actual organizational settings in which we measured our constructs of interest. We 
relied on leaders as the source for all measures in Study 2.2. In Study 2.3, we used 
a multisource approach such that leaders assessed our independent variables (i.e., 
sense of power and sense of belongingness) and subordinates assessed leader self-
sacrifice. 
 
2.2 STUDY 2.1 
 
2.2.1 Method 
 
Participants and design. Ninety-eight undergraduate students at a Dutch 
university (36 males, 62 females, Mage = 20.39 SD = 1.90) participated voluntarily 
in the study, in exchange for EURO 7 ($10). Participants were randomly assigned 
to a 2 (sense of power: low vs. high) x 2 (sense of belongingness: low vs. high) 
between-subjects design. 
Procedure. Participants sat in adjacent yet soundproof cubicles, in which 
they worked on the experiment using a computer. We explained that they would 
take part in a six-person group brainstorming task on how to improve facilities at 
their university. Participants were assigned to either the role of group leader or 
regular group member based on a questionnaire they had answered at the start of 
the experiment, which ostensibly measured leadership skills. In reality, every 
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participant was assigned to the leader position and was thus led to believe that he 
or she would be the leader of a group of five others who – after the leader was 
appointed – allegedly were seated together in a nearby classroom by a lab 
assistant. 
Subsequently, the leader performed two tasks to establish a relationship 
between the leader and the followers. This was important because at a later stage 
we manipulated the leader’s sense of belongingness in the group. The first task of 
the leader was to choose and distribute some tasks to his or her followers. As a 
second task, the leader introduced him-/herself to the group by answering some 
questions about his/her personal life and ideas about working together in a group. 
Ostensibly, these answers would be communicated to the group. 
Then, we introduced the leader’s sense of power manipulation using a 
priming procedure developed by Galinsky et al. (2003). Specifically, half of the 
leaders had to recall and write down a situation in which they had experienced 
power over another person or persons (inducing a high sense of power) while the 
other half had to write about a situation in which they had experienced the power 
of others over themselves (inducing a low sense of power). This power prime is 
the most commonly used manipulation of sense of power and has proven to be 
very effective (e.g., Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote; 
2007b, 2007c; Smith & Trope, 2006; Smith, Dijksterhuis & Wigboldus, 2008). 
Thereafter, the leader was required to listen to the group discussing the 
task for about a minute via a microphone that was secretly placed in the room 
where the other group members allegedly had gathered. At this point, the 
belongingness manipulation was introduced as the leader overheard the group 
gossiping either positively (inducing a high sense of belongingness) or negatively 
(inducing a low sense of belongingness) about him/herself. Gossip is an important 
social force within groups and organizations (Kurland & Pelled, 2000) and is a 
potential mechanism through which leaders become aware of how they are 
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evaluated socially by their followers (Hallet, Harger & Eder, 2009). The group 
gossip used here was in fact a scripted group conversation pre-recorded with the 
help of semi-professional actors. Inspired by the extensive literature on social 
inclusion, we identified three important aspects of belongingness, namely feeling 
liked, accepted, and respected (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; De Cremer, 2002, 
Leary, 2001). For each of these aspects we included sentences in the dialogue, for 
instance “...(does not) seem(s) like a nice person” [liking], “I (do not) appreciate 
the leader’s contribution” [respect], “I can (not) understand why this person is 
appointed leader” [acceptance]. A manipulation check confirmed that all 
participants overheard the group conversation. 
Next, as an introduction to the dependent measures, we told the leader 
there would be an extra assignment for which the group would be rewarded with a 
financial bonus. However, s/he was also told, this assignment (i.e., presenting the 
results) was designed for groups of only four people. Hence, the leader had to 
decide which two group members had to leave. We then asked whether the leader 
was willing to give up part of his/her own financial bonus to benefit these two 
group members. Subsequently, the leader learned that the task might not be 
finished in time and we asked whether the leader was willing to invest his/her -
own time to help out the group. Finally, we thanked, debriefed, and paid the 
participants. 
 
2.2.2 Results  
 
Participants responded to all measures on a seven-point Likert-scale (1 = 
Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree).  
Manipulation checks. A 2 (power) x 2 (belongingness) ANOVA on 
perceived power (two items, α = .85, “I think I had a great deal of power in this 
situation”, “I could get others to do what I wanted in this situation”) revealed a 
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significant main effect of power, F(1,94) = 165.88, p < .001, showing that 
participants in the high sense of power condition felt more powerful than 
participants in the low sense of power condition (Ms = 5.30 vs 2.41, SDs = 1.09 
and 1.09 respectively). Neither the main effect of belongingness, F(1,94) < 1, ns, 
nor the interaction, F(1,94) < 1, ns was significant.  
In addition, two independent judges blind to the conditions rated the 
essays of the participants on power. The ratings of the judges (α = .90) were 
combined into a power scale for further analyses. The participants in the high 
power condition were judged to have more power (M = 4.97, SD = .93) in their 
described situation than participants in the low power condition (M = 2.51, SD = 
.70), F(1,94) = 209.83, p < .001. Neither a main effect for belongingness F(1,94) < 
1, ns, nor an interaction effect was found F(1,94) < 1, ns.  
Our belongingness manipulation check consisted of four items (α = .97) 
based on the work of Baumeister and Leary (1995), De Cremer (2002) and Leary 
(2001, p. 4), which assessed to what extent participants felt “accepted”, 
“respected”, and “liked” by the group and “connected” to the group. A two-way 
ANOVA revealed that participants in the high belongingness condition 
experienced higher belongingness (M = 5.71, SD = .93) to the group than 
participants in the low belongingness condition (M = 2.04, SD = .84), F(1,94) = 
406.77, p < .001. Neither the main effect of power, F(1,94) = 1.32, p > .25 nor the 
interaction, F(1,94) < 1, ns, was significant. In sum, both the power and 
belongingness manipulation were successfully and independently induced. 
Self-sacrifice. We measured self-sacrifice with two items inspired by the 
work of Choi and Mai-Dalton (1998, 1999) and Conger and Kanungo (1998) (i.e., 
“Will you … give up your own financial bonus?” and “…invest your own time.”), 
which were combined into an average self-sacrifice scale (r = .34, p < .001) for 
further analyses. The mean scores and standard deviations of leader’s self-sacrifice 
are reported in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1: Leader’s Self-Sacrifice by Sense of Power and Sense of Belongingness Condition 
(Study 2.1) 
 Low Sense of Power High Sense of Power 
 M SD M SD 
Low Sense of Belongingness 3.36 1.06 4.00 1.48 
High Sense of Belongingness 4.07 .97 3.91 1.22 
N = 98 
 
A two-way ANOVA revealed no main effect of power, F(1,94) < 1, ns, or 
belongingness, F(1,94) = 1.54, p = .22. However, as predicted, a significant 
interaction was found, F(1,94) = 4.08, p < .05, f = .18, see Figure 2.1. Simple 
effects tests revealed a significant effect of sense of belongingness, but only in the 
low sense of power condition F(1,94) = 4.16, p < .05, and not in the high sense of 
power condition F(1,94) < 1, ns. Participants who received positive belongingness 
information were thus more willing to engage in self-sacrificial behavior than 
participants who received negative belongingness information, but only when they 
were low in sense of power.  
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Figure 2.1: Interaction between Leader’s Sense of Power and Leader’s Sense of Belongingness 
on Leader Self-Sacrifice (Study 2.1) 
 
2.2.3 Discussion  
 
The results of Study 2.1 show that belongingness information (inducing 
high or low sense of belongingness) from followers positively affected leader’s 
self-sacrifice, but only among leaders with a low sense of power. This is consistent 
with our hypothesis that sense of power might act as a substitute for sense of 
belongingness. Leader with a high sense of power appear to engage in self-
sacrificial behavior regardless of their sense of belongingness. To our knowledge, 
Study 2.1 provides the first empirical support that sense of belongingness and 
sense of power are antecedents of leader self-sacrifice. 
Although prior research has demonstrated the value of lab experiments, 
providing us with findings high in internal validity (De Cremer & Van 
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Knippenberg, 2002, 2004), a possible limitation of our experimental design 
concerns the fact that leaders had neither actual face-to-face contact with their 
followers nor a shared history or the prospect of future interaction and cooperation 
with these followers. Another concern might be that the power prime manipulation 
we used in Study 2.1 induced a general sense of power, whereas in our theoretical 
rationale we focus on leader’s sense of power in the organization, by arguing that 
feeling powerful facilitates behavior that contributes to the organization’s goals 
and interest. Therefore, we conducted a second study to address these concerns by 
testing our predictions in an actual work environment. In this second study, we 
measured leader’s sense of power in the organization, rather than leader’s general 
sense of power. 
 
2.3 STUDY 2.2 
 
2.3.1 Method 
 
Sample and procedure. Participants were 411 organizational supervisors 
(51.1% male, 48.9% female, Mage = 42.65 SD = 10.93) from a variety of Dutch 
organizations. For their participation, they received credit points they could trade 
in for certain gifts (i.e., a ticket for the movies). The respondents worked an 
average of 34.82 hours each week (SD = 9.00), had been in a supervisor position 
for an average of 6.91 years (SD = 6.85) and supervised an average of 3.32 (SD = 
2.16) employees. Finally, 21.1 % worked for the government, 74.9% worked for 
non-governmental organizations, and 4% worked as temporary employees. 
Measures. All responses were given on a five-point scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = strongly agree). 
We measured leader’s sense of belongingness using a five-item scale (α = 
.88) of which four items were also used in Study 2.1 as a check of our 
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belongingness manipulation. Examples of items are “I feel accepted by my 
employees” and “I feel like I am part of the group.”  We assessed leader’s sense of 
power with the situational version of Anderson, John & Keltner’s (2005, validated 
by Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) eight-item sense of power scale (α = .88).  
Finally, we measured leader’s self-sacrifice with three items (α = .76) 
inspired by the work of Conger and Kanungo (1998), Choi and Mai-Dalton (1998, 
1999), and partly taken from Van Knippenberg & Van Knippenberg (2005, Study 
3). Items included “I am willing to make personal sacrifices for the benefit of the 
team,” “I am prepared to defend the interests of my team members, even if this 
does not serve my own interests,” and “In hard times, team members can count on 
me, even if this does not serve my own interests.” 
 
2.3.2 Results 
 
We calculated the main and interaction effects of leader’s sense of power and 
sense of belongingness on leader’s willingness to engage in self-sacrificial 
behavior to use in hierarchical regression procedures. Following Aiken and West 
(1991), we centered leader’s sense of belongingness and leader’s sense of power 
(by subtracting the means) prior to the analyses and we based the interaction term 
on these centered scores. The results are reported in Table 2.2 and 2.3. 
 
Table 2.2: Means, Standard Deviations and Intercorrelations of Leader’s Self-Sacrifice, 
Leader’s Sense of Power and Leader’s Sense of Belongingness (Study 2.2) 
 M SD 1 2 3 
1. Leader’s self-sacrifice 3.66 .64 -   
2. Leader’s sense of power 3.27 .66 .38*** -  
3. Leader’s sense of belongingness 4.02 .53 .48*** .34*** - 
N = 411. *** p < .001. 
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Leader’s sense of power and leader’s sense of belongingness were 
positively related to leader self-sacrifice, β = .25, p < .001, f2 = .15 and β = .37, p < 
.001, f2 = .29 respectively. Furthermore, we found a significant interaction effect 
between leader’s sense of power and leader’s sense of belongingness, β = -.09, p < 
.05, f2 = .03. A simple slopes analysis (Aiken & West, 1991; see Figure 2.2) 
revealed that, as expected, leader’s sense of belongingness was significantly more 
positively related to leader’s self-sacrifice when the leader’s sense of power was 
low (1 SD below the mean; β = .45, p < .001) than when leader’s sense of power 
was high (1 SD above the mean; β = .29, p < .001).   
 
Table 2.3: Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Leader’s Self-Sacrifice on Leader’s 
Sense of Power and Leader’s Sense of Belongingness (Study 2.2) 
 β R2 Adj R2 R2 change df 
Step 1  .28 .28 .28 2, 408 
Leader’s sense of power .25***     
Leader’s sense of belongingness .39***     
Step 2  .29 .28 .01 1, 407 
Leader’s sense of power .25***     
Leader’s sense of belongingness .37***     
Leader’s sense of power x 
Leader’s sense of belongingness 
-.09*     
* p < .05, *** p < .001 
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Figure 2.2.: Interaction between Leader’s Sense of Power and Leader’s Sense of Belongingness 
on Leader Self-Sacrifice (Study 2.2) 
 
2.3.3 Discussion  
 
Study 2.2 revealed support for our idea that sense of power functions as a 
substitute of sense of belongingness in an actual work environment: Leader self-
sacrifice was positively affected by leader’s sense of belongingness, but 
particularly so when the leader was low in sense of power. By replicating the 
interaction effect as found in our lab study (Study 2.1) in this field study, we 
provide findings that are high in both internal and external validity. However, a 
possible limitation of Study 2.2 is that our measurement of leader’s self-sacrifice 
was based upon self-report ratings, leaving room for socially desirable or self-
serving answers (e.g., Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002; Moorman & Podsakoff, 
1992). Therefore, we conducted a third study, of which the purpose was twofold. 
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The first goal was to replicate the findings of Studies 2.1 and 2.2 using a different 
measure of leader self-sacrifice, as the use of constructive replication has been 
argued to strengthen the validity of findings (Lykken, 1968). A second goal of 
Study 2.3 was to provide a more objective measure of leader self-sacrifice, one 
that is not based upon leaders’ self-report ratings. Therefore, Study 3 had a 
multisource design, in which leader’s sense of power and sense of belongingness 
were based upon self-report ratings of the leader. This time, however, we assessed 
leader self-sacrifice using follower ratings (i.e., a multisource design).  
 
2.4  STUDY 2.3 
 
2.4.1 Method 
 
 Sample and procedure. We invited 402 undergraduate business students 
from a university in the southeastern United States to take part in the study and 
177 participated (for a response rate of 44%). To avoid same source bias concerns, 
we used a snowballing method whereby undergraduate students working at least 
20 hours a week served as the subordinate, or could choose another working adult 
(i.e., friend, relative, colleague) to serve as the subordinate. The subordinate asked 
his/her supervisor to also participate in the study (e.g., see also De Cremer, Mayer, 
Van Dijke, Schouten, & Bardes, 2009; Lee & Allen, 2002; Skarlicki & Folger, 
1997). We administered the subordinate and supervisor surveys online and gave 
each respondent a unique identification number to ensure anonymity and to make 
sure we could match the subordinate and supervisor data. We took a number of 
steps to ensure that the surveys were completed by the correct sources. First, in 
introducing the study, we emphasized the importance of integrity in the scientific 
process. We told the students that it was essential for the focal and coworker 
respondents to fill out the correct surveys. Second, when participants submitted 
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their on-line surveys, time stamps and IP addresses were recorded to ensure that 
the employee and supervisor surveys were submitted at different times and with 
different IP addresses. We found no irregularities in the responses. 
A total of 334 individuals (177 subordinates and 157 supervisors) 
participated in the study. We could only include data of respondents who had 
matching supervisor data, which resulted in 148 matched leader-follower dyads 
(i.e., subordinate-supervisor dyads). The subordinates (48.3% female) were an 
average of 24.8 years old. As for their ethnic background, 5.4% were African 
American, 3.4% Asian American, 67.6% Caucasian, 13.5% Hispanic, 2.7% 
Latino, 0.7% Native American, 2% Biracial, and 4.7% of the respondents listed 
“other”. They worked an average of 3.5 years in the organization and 43.9% 
worked full-time.  
The average age of the supervisors (41.5 % female) was 38.9 years old and 
7.6% were African American, 0.7% Asian American, 75.9% Caucasian, 6.9% 
Hispanic, 4.8% Latino, 0.7% Native American, 1.4% Biracial, and 2% of the 
participants listed “other.” The supervisors worked an average of 8.5 years in the 
organization and 97.9% worked full-time. 
 The supervisor filled out measures of his/her sense of power and sense of 
belongingness. The subordinate reported on leader self-sacrifice. 
Measures. All responses were given on a seven-point scale (1= “Strongly 
disagree”, 7= ”Strongly agree”). 
 Leader’s sense of power was assessed with the same version of Anderson 
et al.’s (2005, validated by Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) eight-item sense of power 
scale that we used in Study 2.2 (α = .83). 
 Leader’s sense of belongingness was assessed with a four-item scale (α = 
.61) inspired by the work of Baumeister and Leary (1995). Examples of items are 
“I do not feel part of my team” (reversed) and “I feel like I belong to my team.” 
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 Leader self-sacrifice was assessed with two items (r = .52, p < .01) 
inspired by the work of Conger and Kanungo (1998) and Choi and Mai-Dalton 
(1998, 1999). These items were “My supervisor is not willing to give up privileges 
if the team needs this” and “My supervisor is not willing to take on extra work to 
help a team member, if this means that he/she has to stay longer than usual.” We 
reverse coded both items for interpretation and to facilitate comparison between 
the studies.  
 
2.4.2 Results 
 
 The means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations between the study 
variables are displayed in Table 2.4. We tested the hypotheses using the same 
hierarchical regression procedures as in Study 2.2. The regression results are 
shown in Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.4: Means, Standard Deviations and Intercorrelations of Leader’s Self-Sacrifice, 
Leader’s Sense of Power and Leader’s Sense of Belongingness (Study 2.3) 
 M SD 1 2 3 
1. Leader self-sacrifice 4.82 1.53    
2. Leader’s sense of power 5.17 1.12 .33***   
3. Leader’s sense of belongingness 5.70 .99 .35*** .57***  
Note. Higher scores indicate higher leader self-sacrifice, etc. 
N = 148. *** p < .001.  
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Table 2.5: Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Leader’s Self-Sacrifice on Leader’s 
Sense of Power and Leader’s Sense of Belongingness (Study 2.3) 
 β R2 Adj R2 R2 change df 
Step 1  .15 .14 .15 2, 142 
Leader’s sense of power .20*     
Leader’s sense of belongingness .23*     
Step 2  .17 .15 .02 1, 141 
Leader’s sense of power .21*     
Leader’s sense of belongingness .22*     
Leader’s sense of belongingness x 
Leader’s sense of belongingness 
-.16*     
* p < .05  
 
The analyses showed that both leader’s sense of power (β = .20, p < .05, f2 
= .12) and leader’s sense of belongingness (β = .23, p < .05, f2 = .14) were 
positively related to leader self-sacrifice. Furthermore, we found a significant 
interaction between leader’s sense of power and leader’s sense of belongingness, β 
= -.16, p < .05, f2 = .03, see Figure 2.3. Simple slopes analyses (Aiken and West, 
1991) revealed that, as expected, when leader’s sense of power was low (1 SD 
below the mean), leader’s sense of belongingness was positively related to leader’s 
self-sacrifice, β = .39, p < .01. On the other hand, when leader’s sense of power 
was high (1 SD above the mean), the relationship between leader’s sense of 
belongingness and leader self-sacrifice was non-significant, β = .06, p = .65. 
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Figure 2.3: Interaction between Leader’s Sense of Power and Leader’s Sense of Belongingness 
on Leader Self-Sacrifice (Study 2.3) 
  
2.4.3 Summary 
 
 Study 2.3 revealed that the predicted interaction effect is also found when 
followers (i.e., subordinates) rate their leaders’ self-sacrificial behavior. Followers 
found their supervisors to be more self-sacrificial when these leaders felt socially 
included, but only when those leaders felt low in sense of power. The self-
sacrificial behavior of leaders with a high sense of power was not predicted by 
their sense of belongingness, which provides additional support for our assumption 
that sense of power functions as a substitute of sense of belongingness with regard 
to leader self-sacrifice. 
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2.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
An extraordinary way in which leaders can contribute to their group or 
organization is by engaging in self-sacrificial behavior. Indeed, when leaders 
engage in such personally risky or costly behavior, they positively influence 
perceptions and actions of their subordinates and direct these subordinates towards 
the goals of the organization (Conger & Kanungo, 1987; Shamir et al., 1993). 
Rather than focusing on consequences of self-sacrificial leadership, which has 
been the primary focus of past research, the present research is –at least to our 
knowledge- the first to study the antecedents of self-sacrificial leader behavior. 
Specifically, we focused on the interplay between an antecedent relating to what 
leaders have in common with other group members (i.e., leaders’ sense of 
belongingness) and an antecedent that derives from the unique position that 
leaders have in the group (i.e., leaders’ sense of power). We predicted that leader 
self-sacrifice would emerge when leaders experience a sense of belongingness to 
their followers as this should direct their focus to the group’s welfare. However, 
we expected this influence of leaders’ sense of belongingness to be relatively 
limited for leaders high in sense of power because these leaders might already be 
more likely to act in ways that contribute to the organization’s welfare. Put 
differently, sense of power might function as a substitute for the positive effect of 
sense of belongingness in motivating leaders to engage in self-sacrificial behavior. 
In contrast, leaders low in sense of power should be relatively sensitive to 
belongingness information when determining whether they will engage in costly 
and risky behaviors that serve their group. Across different types of methodologies 
(i.e., a lab study and a single and multisource field study), using different measures 
and manipulations and conducted in two different countries (the Netherlands and 
the U.S.), we found clear and robust support for these predictions.  
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2.5.1 Theoretical implications 
 
The present research responds to recent calls for more research on 
antecedents rather than consequences of leader behavior (e.g., Bommer, Rubin & 
Baldwin, 2004; Scott, Colquitt & Paddock, 2009). Indeed, we should not only look 
at which leader behaviors are effective, but also at situational and dispositional 
variables that affect when and/or why leaders display these effective behaviors. 
Our findings not only show that sense of belongingness and sense of power are 
relevant antecedents of one such effective leader behavior (self-sacrifice), but also 
provide useful insights regarding the role followers might play in leaders’ 
decision-making processes, which is in line with recent calls for more empirical 
research on the role of followers in the psychology of leadership (see Shamir, 
2007 for an overview). Although there have been some studies that focused on 
how followers affect leader behavior (e.g., Farris & Lim, 1969; Greene, 1975; 
Lowin & Craig, 1968; Sims & Szylagyi, 1979), the focus of research has 
overwhelmingly been leader-centered. This dominant perspective which suggests 
that leader behavior is a one-way process in which influence flows from leaders to 
followers and views followers mainly as passive receivers of social influence has 
been under increased scrutiny in the past decade (e.g., Lord, Brown & Freiberg, 
1999; Northouse, 2004; Van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003). Our present research 
testifies to this issue by adopting a more balanced perspective on leadership and 
showing that leaders’ behavior is influenced by their social relations with their 
followers (see also Korsgaard, Roberson & Rymph, 1998), but especially for 
leaders who do not feel powerful. Specifically, our results show that when leaders 
have a low sense of power their self-sacrifice is affected by how included they feel 
in their group or team.  
Our findings also contribute to the existing power literature. Past research 
often focused on the corrupting influence of power on perceptions, decisions and 
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behavior. Those studies show for example that power is often used by people for 
their self-interest (Kipnis, 1976) and self-enhancement (Georgesen & Harris, 
1998). More recently, power has been associated with more prosocial behaviors 
(e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007b; Overbeck & Park, 2006; Schmid Mast 
et al., 2009), and  with more goal directed and role consistent behavior (Chen et 
al., 2001; Galinsky et al., 2003 Guinote; 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Smith & Trope, 
2006; Smith et al., 2008). Our findings fit in with and extend those recent studies 
by showing that feeling powerful might also facilitate costly and risky prosocial 
leader behaviors such as self-sacrifice (see also Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). 
Leaders who feel powerful (i.e. have a high sense of power) appear to be 
motivated and confident to act in ways that contribute to and benefit the company, 
which can be seen as an indispensable part of their role as a leader (e.g., Van Vugt 
et al., 2008). More importantly, when the opportunity arises, they will likely act in 
ways that serve their group or organization, even when this means giving up 
privileges, welfare or time (i.e., self-sacrificing). We believe these findings 
contribute to a more balanced and complete picture of the role of power in the 
psychology of leadership by showing that power does not necessarily corrupt 
leader behavior.     
Of course, our claim that sense of power can substitute for sense of 
belongingness also implies that sense of belongingness can substitute for sense of 
power. Additional analyses1 show support for this alternative perspective on our 
findings. That is, when they feel included, leaders engage in self-sacrificial 
behavior regardless of how powerful they feel. Sense of power then only appears 
                                                          
1 In Study 2.1, sense of power revealed a significant effect in the low F(1,94) = 4.83, p < .05, but not in the high 
belongingness condition F(1,94) < 1, ns. In Study 2.2, sense of power was significantly more positively related to 
leader’s self-sacrifice when the leader’s sense of belongingness was low (1 SD below the mean; β = .33, p < .001) 
than when leader’s sense of belongingness was high (1 SD above the mean; β = .17, p < .01). Finally, in Study 2.3 
leader’s sense of power was positively related to leader’s self-sacrifice when leader’s sense of belongingness was 
low (1 SD below the mean, β = .37, p < .01), but not when leader’s sense of belongingness was high (1 SD above 
the mean, β = .04, p = .72). 
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to facilitate self-sacrifice when leaders experience a low sense of belongingness. 
This perspective actually fits well into our current theoretical rationale: When 
leaders experience a high sense of belongingness they already feel a strong 
alignment with the interests of their followers, making their sense of power less 
relevant as a predictor of self-sacrifice. In fact, such leaders would generally be 
inclined to engage in self-sacrifice. When they do not feel a strong alignment with 
the interests of their group (i.e., when they feel excluded), sense of power becomes 
important in motivating leaders to contribute to their group and organization.  
 
2.5.2 Practical implications 
 
What can organizations do to stimulate leaders’ displays of self-sacrificial 
behavior? First of all, we argue that organizations could benefit from monitoring 
relations between followers and supervisors and addressing signals of negative 
relationships between these two parties. In light of this recommendation, 
organizations are thus advised to stimulate positive relations between leaders (e.g., 
managers) and their employees, for instance through team-building exercises. 
Second, organizations could benefit from giving their managers more autonomy. 
This way, managers are free to choose how to act among their followers, which 
could have a positive effect on their sense of belongingness. Moreover, increased 
autonomy is likely to increase leader’s sense of power (Van Dijke & Poppe, 2006), 
and this should, in turn, not only make a leader more resilient against negative 
follower influence, but also more likely to shape his/her influence in ways that 
serve the interests of the organization.  
It has to be noted that top management is often wary of increasing 
autonomy (Yukl & Fu, 1999) and decentralizing decision-making processes in 
their organization. This is understandable; it is difficult to hand over control over 
processes that one bears final responsibility for (Bedeian & Zammuto, 1991). 
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Nevertheless, top management should realize that organizations are necessarily 
social collectives and the quality of interactions between leaders and their teams 
will increase the effectiveness of the organization as a whole. Moreover, our 
research suggests that such a leap of faith (i.e., handing over autonomy to team 
supervisors) may actually make such managers focus more on the goals of the 
organization (see also Overbeck & Park, 2006). Overall, by stimulating positive 
relationships between their leaders and followers and giving their leaders more 
autonomy, organizations can create an environment in which leaders will exert 
their influence in ways that serve the interests of their employees and the 
organization.  
 
2.5.3 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 
It should be noted that although this research is the first to empirically 
address the antecedents of self-sacrificial behavior of leaders, there are still 
unanswered questions concerning other possible motives leaders might have for 
engaging in self-sacrificial behavior. Because leader self-sacrifice often has 
positive effects on followers such as trust, affect and cooperation (De Cremer, 
2006; Van Knippenberg & Van Knippenberg, 2005), one such concern is whether 
we can actually speak of a true sacrifice for the leader or whether it is in the 
leader’s self-interest to self-sacrifice (for a debate on this topic, see Avolio and 
Locke, 2002). Indeed, leaders may use self-sacrifice not purely for altruistic 
reasons, but at least partly for strategic or instrumental reasons (Avolio and Locke, 
2002). Still, leader self-sacrifice, like other leader behaviors, is in the eyes of the 
beholder and hence, we believe that as long as followers perceive their leader’s 
sacrifice to be personally costly or risky, we can call the leader’s behavior self-
sacrificial. The extent to which this is the case provides an interesting avenue for 
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future research, especially since the motives behind leaders’ actions are considered 
important by followers (Ames, Flynn & Weber, 2004).  
Another interesting topic to explore in future studies is the potential effect 
of mixed messages from followers on leader self-sacrifice. In other words, is 
leader self-sacrifice affected when some group members communicate messages 
of social inclusion and others communicate exclusion? An interesting starting 
point in answering this question might be to look at research that has (albeit 
indirectly) addressed why exclusion leads to less prosocial behavior (although this 
research focused on general prosocial behavior, not behavior targeted at the source 
of inclusion; Twenge et al., 2007). This research suggests that people who are 
excluded feel uncertain that their inputs in the group will (in the short or long run) 
be reciprocated by the group. From this perspective, being excluded appears to 
decrease positive group-oriented behaviors because people fear that they will be 
taken advantage of. It is likely that mixed messages of inclusion and exclusion 
also increase the fear of being taken advantage of, and thus decrease prosocial 
behavior. It would be interesting to study whether we can extend this idea to self-
sacrifice, and whether mixed messages might also decrease leader self-sacrifice. 
 
2.5.4 Concluding remarks 
We believe the major strength of the present research lies in identifying 
how subjectively sensed power and sense of belongingness interactively stimulate 
leader self-sacrifice. By focusing on the antecedents of this important type of 
leader behavior, the present study can be seen as a first step in painting a more 
complete picture of self-sacrificial leadership. After all, previous research in the 
leadership literature has mainly focused on leader behaviors that are effective, 
while still not much is known about when and why leaders engage in such 
behaviors. It is a path that should provide fruitful avenues for future research on 
the "when" and "why" of leader behavior. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
WHEN ARE LEADERS FAIR? THE ROLE OF FOLLOWERS’ 
CONTROL AND RELATIONAL NEEDS IN LEADERS’ 
ENACTMENT OF FAIR PROCEDURES 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Modern business leaders such as Jack Welch, classic philosophers 
Socrates and Aristotle, civil rights leader Martin Luther King, and scientist Albert 
Einstein have at least one thing in common: They have all stressed the importance 
of fairness in our society. One influential type of fairness that has been the focus 
of considerable research attention over the last three decades is the fairness of 
procedures that authorities use to allocate outcomes and make decisions (i.e., 
procedural fairness, Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Research shows 
that procedural fairness positively influences a variety of attitudinal and behavioral 
outcomes that are important to organization functioning and employee wellbeing 
(see De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005; Van den Bos & Lind, 
2002 for overviews). For instance, procedural fairness promotes employees’ job 
satisfaction (Sweeney & McFarlin, 1993), organizational commitment (Tyler, 
Boeckmann, Smith & Huo, 1997), cooperative employee behavior like 
organizational citizenship behavior (De Cremer & Van Knippenberg., 2002, 
2003), and even in-role performance (Zapata-Phelan, Colquitt, Scott & Livingston, 
2009).  
Enacting procedures in a fair manner is thus clearly an important part of 
being an effective leader. Yet, in reality, authority figures do not always practice it 
(Brockner, 2006; Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; Greenberg, 2009). This begs the 
question exactly what makes leaders decide to treat their followers in a 
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procedurally fair manner. Although this question appears to be highly relevant, to 
date, procedural fairness research has focused primarily on people’s reactions to 
fair or unfair treatment by authorities (i.e., a receiver perspective, Scott, Colquitt 
& Paddock, 2009). In fact, despite numerous calls for procedural fairness research 
from the perspective of the leader (an actor perspective), hardly any empirical 
attention has been given to the psychological conditions under which leader 
figures enact procedures in a fair manner (for a recent discussion on this issue, see 
Scott et al., 2009; for an exception, see Brebels, De Cremer, Van Dijke & Van 
Hiel, 2011).  
In the present study, we develop and test a model that explains when 
authorities will enact procedures fairly. Because an indispensable part of being an 
effective and influential leader is to recognise and respond in an adequate manner 
to follower needs (Bass, Avolio, Jung & Berson, 2003; Conger & Kanungo, 1987, 
Goleman, 2000), we build our framework on research that has identified people’s 
need for control and need to belong as two important motives that explain why 
followers care so deeply about procedural fairness (for an overview, see 
Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel & Rupp, 2001; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005). Applying 
these insights to an actor perspective of procedural fairness enactment (Scott et al., 
2009), we set out to investigate whether leaders’ enactment of fair procedures is 
also regulated by their followers’ control and belongingness needs. 
 
3.1.1 Why people care about procedural fairness: control and belonging 
 
Procedural fairness refers to the perceived fairness of decision making 
procedures (Tyler, 1989). Generally speaking, when decision making procedures 
are accurate, consistent, correctable, ethical, unbiased, and when members of 
social collectives are given the opportunity to voice their opinion, they evaluate 
these procedures as fair (Leventhal, 1980; Sheppard & Lewicki, 1987).  
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The topic of procedural fairness was put on the research agenda by 
Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) publication of their influential control model of 
justice. The central premise of this model is that people value fair procedures in 
their relationships with authorities because it gives them the feeling that these 
authorities take their interests into account, which maximizes the probability of 
favourable outcomes in decision making processes (Greenberg & Folger, 1983; 
Tyler, 1987). This control model has received clear support in the literature. For 
instance, research shows that fair procedures such as voice give people a sense that 
their views are taken into consideration by decision makers and consequently, that 
they can influence outcomes more than when procedures are unfair (Barry & 
Shapiro, 2000; Greenberg, 2000; Shapiro, 1993). Moreover, other research shows 
that people react to the fairness of decision making procedures particularly when 
they feel that they lack control (Van den Bos, 2001, Study 2) and when they 
actually do lack control in the decisions of authorities (Korsgaart, Schweiger & 
Sapienza, 1995). Thus, the control model of justice indicates that people care 
about fair procedures, because it serves their need for control (Cropanzano et al., 
2001). 
Yet, other research shows that control cannot be the only motive that 
explains people’s reactions to the fairness of decision making procedures. For 
instance, Lind, Kanfer & Early (1990) showed that people react positively to 
having voice after the decision has been made, making it impossible that their 
input will affect the actual decision. Studies like these have paved the way for 
relational models of justice such as the group-value model and the relational 
model of authority (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). These models build 
on the influential finding that people have a strong need to belong to social 
collectives (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). In support of these models, a wealth of 
research indicates that people care about fair procedures because they 
communicate a symbolic message of acceptance and standing in the group or 
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organization (e.g., Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Furthermore, 
several studies show that particularly those individuals with a strong need to 
belong are affected by the fairness of procedures and process information about 
procedures carefully (De Cremer & Blader, 2006; see also De Cremer & Tyler, 
2005; Van Prooyen, Van den Bos & Wilke, 2004).  
Taken together, a vast amount of work shows that people care about 
procedural fairness  because it serves their need for control as well as their need to 
belong (e.g., Cropanzano et al., 2001; Mayer, Bardes & Piccolo, 2008). Leaders 
who enact procedures fairly are thus able to serve and contribute positively to the 
control and belonging needs of their followers. But do leaders take these needs 
into account when enacting fair procedures? 
 
3.1.2 The present study: An actor perspective on fairness enactment 
 
 Arguably the most important goal of leadership is to direct followers 
towards the goals of their organization (e.g., Hollander, 1980; Yukl & Van Fleet, 
1992). At the same time, leadership does not operate in a social vacuum in which 
influence only flows from the leader to the follower and where followers are 
passive receivers of influence from their leaders (see Shamir, 2007 for an 
overview). Rather, leaders and followers have a dynamic and interdependent 
relationship that is characterized by exchange processes and mutual influence 
(Hollander, 1992; Tjosvold, 1989; Weick ,1979). Therefore, leaders are likely 
motivated to balance between, on the one hand serving the needs of their 
followers, and, at the same time, serving their organization’s interest.  
Following this line of reasoning and applying it to the present research 
question, leaders can be expected to sometimes take into account the control need 
of their followers. That is, leaders will sometimes be willing to grant followers 
with a high control need a certain level of control in decision making processes 
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through the enactment of fair procedures (i.e., voice). However, this will likely 
only be the case for followers who, according to the leaders’ perception, also care 
strongly about being a part of the organization and contributing to the organization 
(i.e., have a high need to belong).   
This line of reasoning leads to the following Hypothesis: 
Leaders will adapt their enactment of fair procedures to the strength of their 
followers’ control and belongingness needs such that leaders will be fair 
particularly when interacting with followers with a strong control and a strong 
belongingness need. 
We tested this prediction regarding the interactive effect of followers’ 
control and belongingness need on leaders’ enactment of fair procedures in two 
studies. Study 3.1 is a laboratory experiment. All participants were assigned to the 
position of group leader. We independently manipulated the strength of the control 
and belongingness need of one their followers. Study 3.2 was a field study that 
relied on employees and their leaders from a variety of different organizations as 
respondents. This study applied a multisource design in which leaders rated their 
follower’s belongingness and control needs and followers rated their leader’s 
procedural fairness. 
 
3.2 STUDY 3.1 
 
3.2.1 Method 
 
 Participants. Ninety-eight students (73 females and 25 males, Mage = 
21.01 years, SD = 4.41) from a Dutch University, participated in this study in 
return for 7 Euros. They were randomly assigned to a 2 (follower control need: 
low vs. high) x 2 (follower belongingness need: low vs. high) design. 
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Procedure. Upon arriving in the lab, participants learned that they would 
take part in a group study. Sitting in adjacent, soundproof cubicles, they worked 
on the study using a computer. All communication took place via the computer, 
which participants believed to be linked to a central server. In the first part of the 
experiment, participants filled out several questionnaires. We would ostensibly use 
these questionnaires later on to appoint them to a leader position and also to make 
our manipulations of follower control and belongingness needs credible.  
Next, the participants learned that they would work on an in basket test, a 
task that is often used in personnel selection procedures to assess specific 
competencies of job applicants. We chose this task, because it provides a realistic 
work setting to our laboratory experiment (cf. Trevino, 1992; Zedeck, 1986). In 
this task, job applicants are faced with a series of memo’s, emails and documents 
which they have to prioritize, fit into their schedule and respond to. In the present 
study, we utilized a version of this test that involves a group situation in which 
there is one leader (i.e., manager) and a group of employees. Participants believed 
that these roles would be appointed based upon their answers to some of the 
questionnaires that they filled out at the start of the experiment and that ostensibly 
measured leadership skills. In reality, every participant was appointed to the leader 
position and believed that (s)he supervised four employees.  
After being explained in detail what the in basket task entailed and what 
the responsibilities of their personal role as a leader would be (e.g., prioritizing 
emails and memos, distributing tasks and supervising employees), we introduced 
the manipulations of employees’ control and belongingness needs. Supposedly to 
get to know their employees better, participants received the results of the analyses 
of their employees’ answers on the questionnaires they had ostensibly filled out at 
the beginning of the experiment. In the high control need conditions, participants 
read the following information about one group member: 
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Group member A is someone who lies awake at night when important 
decisions have to be made in his environment. He is someone who needs to feel 
part of the decision making process so that he can influence the outcomes 
In the low control need conditions, participants read: 
Group member A is someone who does not lie awake at night when 
important decisions have to be made in his environment. He is someone who does 
not need to feel part of the decision making process in order to influence the 
outcomes 
Subsequently, participants received the belongingness information about 
their employee. In the high belongingness need conditions, the participants read: 
The scores also show that Group member A needs to feel at home in his 
environment. Feeling like an included and valued member is of great importance 
to him. 
In the low belongingness need conditions, the participants read: 
The scores also show that Group member A does not need to feel at home 
in his environment. Feeling like an included and valued member is not important 
to him. 
Upon reading this information, participants learned that, as part of the 
task, they would first have to make several important decisions (e.g., distributing 
tasks) concerning this particular follower. They were then introduced to our 
dependent measures. Specifically, they were asked several questions concerning 
their treatment of Group member A when making decisions. Furthermore, they 
were told that they would have to go through 10 individual procedures to make an 
important decision. As a behavioral measure of fairness enactment we asked 
participants in how many of these ten procedures they were planning to grant 
voice to Group member A. Finally, we assessed our manipulation checks and 
participants were thanked, debriefed and paid. 
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Measures. Participants responded to all measures on a seven-point Likert-
scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree).  
Manipulation checks. To assess whether our manipulation of follower 
control need was successful, we asked participants to respond to two items (α = 
.97). Specifically, they had to rate the extent to which they believed that their 
follower (Group member A) needs to feel that he can influence decisions and 
outcomes. 
Likewise, two items (α = .97) were included to assess whether we 
manipulated follower belongingness need successfully. Participants rated the 
extent to which they believed that Group member A likes to feel accepted and 
valued in his environment. 
Dependent measures. We measured leader’s procedural fairness 
enactment with four items based on Colquitt (2001), which were combined in an 
average fairness enactment scale (α = .74). These items measured the extent to 
which leaders wanted to grant voice to their follower. Sample item: [To what 
extent] “…are you willing to invest time to listen to this group member’s opinion 
when making decisions?”. As an additional measure of fairness enactment, 
participants had to indicate in how many of a total of ten individual procedures 
they wanted to grant voice to Group member A. 
 
3.2.2 Results 
  
Manipulation checks. A 2 (follower control need) x 2 (follower 
belongingness need) ANOVA revealed a main effect of follower control need 
F(1,94) = 393.26, p < .001 on the control need scale. Participants in the high 
follower control need condition (M = 6.02, SD = 1.03) perceived a higher follower 
control need than those in the low follower control need condition (M = 2.00, SD = 
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.96). Neither the main effect of follower belongingness need F(1,94) < 1, ns, nor 
the interaction effect was significant F(1,94) < 1, ns. 
 A 2 (follower control need) x 2 (follower belongingness need) ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of follower belongingness need F(1,94) = 310.86, p < .001 
on the belongingness need scale, showing that participants in the high follower 
belongingness need condition (M = 6.42, SD = .66) perceived a higher follower 
belongingness need than those in the low follower belongingness need condition 
(M = 2.49, SD = 1.42). Neither the main effect of follower control need F(1,94) = 
1.99, p = .16, nor the interaction effect was significant F(1,94) < 1, ns.  
Thus, the manipulation checks show that we successfully and independently 
induced our follower control and belongingness needs manipulations. 
Procedural fairness enactment. A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the combined 
fairness enactment scale revealed a marginally significant main effect of follower 
control need F(1,94) = 3.14, p =  .08. Leaders intended to enact fair procedures 
(i.e., grant voice) when interacting with a follower with a high, rather than a low 
control need. Belongingness need did not significantly influence procedural 
fairness enactment of the leader, F(1,94) = 1,06, p = .31. Most importantly, we 
found an interaction effect (see Figure 3.1), F(1,94) = 4.24, p < .05.  
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Figure 3.1: Interaction Between Follower Control Need and Follower Belongingness Need on 
Leader’s Fairness Enactment (Study 3.1). 
 
 
Simple effects tests revealed a significant main effect of follower control 
need when the belongingness need of the follower was high F(1,94) = 7.34, p < 
.01, but not when this need was low F(1,94) < 1, ns.  
As a second measure of leader fairness enactment, we assessed in how 
many out of a total 10 procedures the leaders wanted to grant voice to their 
follower. A 2 x 2 ANOVA on this measure revealed a significant main effect of 
follower control need F(1,94) = 6.06, p < .05. No main effect of follower 
belongingness need was found, F(1,94) = 1.27, p = .26. However, as predicted, a 
significant interaction was found, F(1,94) = 6.06, p < .05 (see Figure 3.2). Simple 
effects tests revealed a significant main effect of follower control need when the 
follower had a high belongingness need F(1,94) = 12.11, p < .01, but not when this 
need was low F(1,94) < 1, ns. 
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Figure 3.2: Interaction Between Follower Control Need and Follower Belongingness Need on 
the Number of Procedures in which Leader Granted Voice to the Follower (Study 3.1). 
 
3.3 STUDY 3.2 
 
In Study 3.1, in an experimental setting we found that leaders adapt their 
fairness enactment to the strength of the control and belongingness needs of a 
follower. Specifically, leaders enacted procedures more fairly (i.e., provided more 
voice opportunities) when interacting with a follower with a high, rather than a 
low control need, but this was particularly the case when the need to belong of the 
follower was also high.  
One possible limitation of the experimental setting we used in Study 3.1 is 
that it is not clear to what extent our findings can be generalized to organizational 
leadership. Therefore, we conducted a second study to test our predictions in 
actual work environments. To reduce concerns about socially desirable or self-
serving biases associated with self report measures (e.g., Donaldson & Grant-
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Vallone, 2002; Moorman & Podsakoff, 1992), we employed a multisource design 
in which leaders rated the control and belongingness needs of one of their 
employees, while their fairness enactment was rated by this employee.  
 
3.3.1 Method 
 
Sample and procedure. 412 members of a Dutch research panel consisting 
of employees from a variety of different organizations were invited to fill out the 
questionnaire on a web page. For their participation, they received credit points 
that would allow them to receive certain gifts (i.e., movie tickets). A total number 
of 312 employees responded by filling out the questionnaire (a response rate of 
75.7%). These employees were requested to ask their direct supervisor to also 
participate in the study. Participants did so by sending a questionnaire link to their 
supervisor. Both the employee and supervisor surveys were administered online 
and we gave each respondent a unique identification number to ensure anonymity 
and to make sure we could match the employee and supervisor data. We took a 
number of steps to ensure that the surveys were completed by the correct sources. 
First, in introducing the study, we emphasized the importance of integrity in the 
scientific process. We told the employees that it was essential for them and their 
supervisor to fill out the correct surveys. Second, when respondents submitted 
their on-line surveys, time stamps and IP addresses were recorded to ensure that 
the employee and supervisor surveys were submitted at different times and with 
different IP addresses. We found no irregularities in the responses. 
A total of 312 employees and 108 supervisors participated in the study. 
We included only the data of focal employees who had complete and matching 
supervisor data, resulting in 93 focal employee-supervisor dyads. The employees 
were on average 43.88 years old (SD = 9.78) and 36.6% were female. They 
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worked on average for 10.9 years (SD = 10.27) in their organization and worked 
an average 6.1 years (SD = 6.51) in their current job. 
The supervisors were on average 46.1 years old (SD = 8.99) and 33.0% 
were female. They worked an average of 12.9 years (SD = 9.55) in their 
organizations and worked an average 6.1 years (SD = 5.51) in their current job.  
Measures. Responses were given on 7-point scales with regard to follower 
control and belongingness need. Responses to the fairness enactment measures 
were given on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). 
Control need. Employee’s need for control was measured using the 
following three-item scale (α = .91) based on the work of Burger & Cooper (1979) 
and Skinner (1996): “This employee has the need to influence important decisions 
in the organization”, “This employee has the need to exercise some level of 
control when decisions are made in the organization” and “This employee finds it 
annoying when you have not taken into account his/her interest in making 
important decisions”. 
Belongingness need. Employee’s need to belong was assessed with a 3 
item scale (α = .92) based on the work of Baumeister & Leary (1995) and included 
“This employee has a high need to feel at home in the organization”, “This 
employee has a high need to feel valued in the organization”, and “This employee 
has a strong need to feel connected to the organization.” 
Procedural fairness enactment. Leader’s enactment of fair procedures 
was measured by a four-item combination (α = .84) inspired by Colquitt (2001). 
The items included “My supervisor listens to my opinion”, “My supervisor 
involves me in his / her decisions”, “My supervisor takes my opinion into 
consideration when making decisions”, “My supervisor takes my feelings into 
account when making decisions”. 
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3.3.3 Results 
 
Table 3.1: Means, Standard Deviations and Intercorrelations of Leader’s Enactment of Fair 
Procedures and Follower’s Control and Belongingness Need (Study 3.2) 
 M SD 1 2 3 
1. Leader’s fairness enactment 3.53 .67 -   
2. follower’s control need 4.65 1.30 .30*** -  
3. follower’s belongingness need 5.23 .86 .31*** .60*** - 
N = 93, *** p<.001. 
 
OLS regression was used to assess the main and interaction effects of 
follower’s control and belongingness need on the leader’s enactment of fair 
procedures. The interaction term was based on the centred versions of the 
independent variables (Aiken & West, 1991). The results are reported in Table 3.1 
and Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2: Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Leader’s Fairness Enactment on 
Follower’s Control and Belongingness Need (Study 3.2) 
 β R2 Adj R2 R2 change df 
Step 1  .12 .10 .12 2, 90 
Control need .20     
Belongingness need .18     
Step 2  .15 .12 .03 1, 89 
Control need .19     
Belongingness need   .28*     
Control need x belongingness need   .20*     
*p<.05 
 
No significant relation between follower control need and leader’s 
enactment of fair procedures was found, β = .19, p = .12. However, follower 
belongingness need was positively related to fairness enactment β = .28, p < .05. 
Furthermore, a significant interaction effect between follower control and 
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belongingness need was found, see Figure 3.3, β = .20, p < .05. Simple slope 
analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) showed that, as expected, follower control need 
was positively related to leader’s enactment of fair procedures when the follower’s 
need to belong was high (1 SD above the mean; β = .31, p < .05), but not when 
follower’s need to belong was low (1 SD below the mean; β = .07, p = .63). 
 
Figure 3.3: Interaction Between Follower Control Need and Follower Belongingness Need on 
Leader’s Procedural Fairness Enactment (Study 3.2). 
 
 
3.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 Research has illustrated convincingly that procedural fairness reveals a 
wide range of positive implications for organizations (for recent overviews, see De 
Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). 
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Although enacting fair procedures clearly is an important managerial tool that 
effectively and positively influences employees (De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 
2002, 2003), surprisingly little research has focused on the question when leaders 
actually enact fair procedures (Scott et al., 2009). The present study therefore 
examined theoretically relevant antecedents of leaders’ enactment of fair 
procedures. We did so by employing a reversed approach with respect to two 
important motives that are known in the fairness literature to explain why people 
care so deeply about fair procedures. Specifically, we examined whether leaders 
take followers’ control and belongingness needs into account in their enactment of 
fair procedures.  
We reasoned that leadership deals with directing followers towards the 
goals of the organization. However, because they have an interdependent 
relationship with their followers, we also argued that leaders are motivated to 
balance the needs of their followers with what is in the best interest for the 
organization. Therefore, we predicted that leaders are willing to enact fair 
procedures (e.g., grant voice) to those follower who have a strong need for control, 
but only when these followers are also care strongly about being a part of the 
organization (i.e., have a high need to belong). Across two studies (one lab study 
and one multisource field study), we found support for this prediction: leaders 
enacted procedures more fairly when interacting with a follower with a high rather 
than a low control need, but this was only the case when the follower also had a 
high need to belong.   
 
3.4.1 Theoretical implications 
 
We build our study on past research that has identified control and 
belonging as two motives that are crucial in explaining why followers care about 
fairness (Cropanzano et al., 2001). The present findings contribute to a more 
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balanced understanding of that knowledge by showing that both follower motives 
also affect the procedural fairness enactment of leaders. In doing so, we respond to 
recent calls for more research on antecedents rather than consequences of effective 
leader behaviors (e.g., Bommer, Rubin & Baldwin, 2004) and specifically on 
procedural fairness enactment (Scott et al., 2009). To our knowledge, the present 
research is among the first to study procedural fairness enactment from a leader 
(actor) perspective (see also Brebels et al., 2011).  
Given that procedural fairness is commonly enacted by leaders (De 
Cremer & Tyler, 2010), it is surprising that enacting fair procedures is rarely 
included as an aspect of leadership in the leadership literature (for a discussion, 
see De Cremer & Tyler, 2005). After all, both leadership and procedural fairness 
deal with influencing and motivating followers (Chemers, 2001; Colquitt & 
Greenberg, 2003). We believe that our research answers the call for more 
integration between the fairness and leadership literature (e.g., De Cremer, 2006; 
De Cremer & Tyler, 2010; Van Knippenberg, De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 
2007). In fact, our finding that the leaders in our studies adapt their fairness 
enactment in decision making processes to the needs of their followers suggests 
that leaders sometimes use fairness as a managerial tool to influence their 
followers. 
Our findings provide an interesting leap from previous work in the 
fairness literature that has argued that leaders might sometimes have difficulty 
with acting fairly (Brockner, 2006; Folger & Skarlicki, 1998). One possible 
explanation for this discrepancy might be that past work focused more on bad 
news situations (such as layoffs) while this was more neutral in our studies. Still, 
our findings provide a rather positive picture of leaders. Indeed, effective and 
influential leaders recognise and respond in an adequate manner to follower needs 
(Bass, Avolio, Jung & Berson, 2003; Conger & Kanungo, 1987, Goleman, 2000). 
Our findings suggest that leaders sometimes take such needs into account, but 
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particularly so when they feel that their followers also want to be part of and 
contribute to the organization’s goals.  
 
3.4.2 Practical implications 
 
Research on fairness training (for an overview, see Skarlicki & Latham, 
2005) shows that leaders can be trained to be fair, and more importantly that these 
programs are effective in inducing positive job attitudes (e.g., satisfaction, 
commitment) and work behaviors (e.g., organizational citizenship behaviors). 
Studying fairness from an actor perspective contributes in identifying potential 
opportunities and pitfalls that can help in further improving fairness training 
programs. Our findings indicate that leaders adapt their behavior to the strength of 
their followers’ motives. Yet, in practice it might often be difficult for leaders to 
recognize and identify the intensity of their followers’ control and belongingness 
needs. Furthermore, to our knowledge, fairness training has focused primarily on 
leader actions rather than on the dynamics between follower needs and leader 
actions (cf. Skarlicki & Latham, 2005). Therefore, fairness training programs 
could benefit from incorporating elements that help leaders to recognize, identify 
and adapt to follower needs (Goleman, 1998). 
Interestingly, our finding that leaders recognize and take follower needs 
into accounts in enacting fair procedures, also suggests that followers themselves 
can sometimes facilitate leaders to enact fair procedures. This is in line with the 
idea that influence between leaders and follower does not only flow from the 
leader to the follower, but also the other way around (see Shamir, 2007 for an 
overview). Specifically, by communicating their need to feel included and need to 
be involved in decision making procedures, followers might contribute to leaders’ 
recognition of their needs. In turn, this should make it more likely that leaders take 
their needs into account in their fairness enactment. Therefore, organizations could 
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also benefit from promoting an environment in which employees are stimulated to 
speak up and discuss their needs with their leaders. 
 
3.4.3 Limitations, strengths and future research 
 
  A major strength of our research is that, using different methodologies 
(i.e., laboratory experiment and multisource field study) across two studies, it is 
among the first to examine fairness enactment from an “actor” perspective. Of 
course, each of our studies has its limitations and strengths. An important strength 
of our lab experiments is that it provides us with findings that are high in internal 
validity (e.g., De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2002). However, by giving leaders 
information about their follower’s personality, we manipulated follower’s control 
and belongingness needs rather explicitly in this study. This may raise some 
concerns on the generalizability of our findings to the actual leadership that is 
common in organizations, in which follower needs might be less explicitly 
presented. We addressed this concern by conducting a second study in which we 
tested our predictions in an actual work environment. To reduce concerns about 
socially desirable or self-serving answers associated with self report measures 
(e.g., Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002; Moorman & Podsakoff, 1992), we 
employed a multisource design in Study 3.2 in which leaders rated the control and 
belongingness needs of one of their employees, while their procedural fairness 
enactment was rated by this particular (focal) employee.  
Given the limited amount of research that has taken this perspective, there 
are of course still many unanswered questions about why and when leaders enact 
fair procedures (Scott et al., 2009). In the present research we examined whether 
leaders take economical (i.e., control) and social (i.e., belonging) concerns of 
followers into account in their fairness enactment. However, we did not focus on a 
third follower motive that has been identified to explain why people care about 
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fairness. That is, people also see fairness as a (moral) value in itself, and people 
want to act in accordance with this as well as being treated accordingly (Folger, 
1998) Therefore, it would be interesting to gain more insight in the underlying 
intentions of leaders’ decision to enact fair procedures or not. Do they enact 
procedures fairly because it’s the right thing to do morally? Or, do they do this for 
strategic and instrumental reasons such as getting their subordinates to comply 
with them through social exchange processes?  
 
3.4.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
Former General Electrics CEO Jack Welch once said: “The hardest part is 
to be fair. No one trains you to be a judge” (Tichy & Sherman, 1993, p. 148). This 
suggests that business leaders a) are aware of the importance of treating employees 
fairly but b) find it difficult to do so. The findings of the present study paint a 
more positive picture of leaders. That is, leaders do appear to be aware of the 
importance of treating employees fairly. However, they do so particularly in  
situations when it satisifies both the follower’s needs and the organization’s 
interest.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
WHY LEADERS NOT ALWAYS DISAPPROVE OF UNETHICAL 
FOLLOWER BEHAVIOR: IT DEPENDS ON THE LEADER’S 
SELF-INTEREST AND ACCOUNTABILITY2 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
An important task for ethical leaders is to create a climate in which it is 
clear what is morally acceptable and what is not. To achieve this level of moral 
clarity, leaders are supposed to act in ways that influence their followers’ ethical 
and unethical decisions and behaviors (Trevino et al., 2000, 2003). One important 
way to communicate what is acceptable and what is not is by showing disapproval 
of unethical follower behavior (UFB from now on; Brown and Trevino, 2006). 
Showing disapproval should make it less likely that followers and their co-workers 
display unethical behaviors in the future (Chonko & Hunt, 1985), whereas 
condoning unethical behavior makes it likely that UFB will prevail or even 
increase (Offerman, 2004). Also, leaders displaying disapproval of UFB create a 
sense of justice among other employees as they will expect their leaders to take 
action against unethical followers (Trevino & Ball, 1992). Given the clear 
importance for organizations that leaders show disapproval when confronted with 
UFB, it is necessary to examine whether leaders, in fact, also show actual 
disapproval of UFB when needed. In the present study we address this question, 
by zooming in on both leader motives and organizational circumstances and how 
they interact in affecting whether leaders display disapproval of UFB.  
                                                          
2 This chapter was based on Hoogervorst, De Cremer & Van Dijke (Journal of Business 
Ethics, 2011) 
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In the present paper, we start from the assumption that leaders in general 
consider taking action against followers to be a highly negative emotional 
experience (Ball & Sims, 1991; Butterfield et al., 1996); a state that may inhibit 
leaders to show disapproval of UFB.  To promote the incidence that leaders do the 
morally right thing (i.e., show disapproval of UFB), organizations often turn to the 
solution of installing systems that monitor leaders’ actions (Lindsay et al., 1996). 
For example, accountability (i.e., having leaders justify their actions to others) has 
been argued to be a necessary social monitoring mechanism for organizations 
(Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Indeed, condoning UFB could lead to considerable 
reputational damage for leaders when there is a possibility that others will find out 
about this. Therefore, being held accountable should motivate leaders to do the 
morally right thing and display disapproval of UFB.  
At the same time, UFB can often be instrumental to the leader (e.g., when  
the leader receives a bonus, because UFB contributed to the sales of his/her 
department) and leaders thus often face a conflict of interest when confronted with 
UFB. This begs the question whether social pressures on the leader (i.e., holding 
leaders accountable) to do the normative and morally right thing (i.e., disapprove 
UFB) will prevail when UFB is instrumental to the leader. In the present paper, we 
propose that the self-interest of leaders can inhibit the social pressure to 
disapprove of UFB and consequently, that accountability is a less efficient tool in 
stimulating leader disapproval when leaders personally benefit from UFB.  
Furthermore, in a second study, we will look at the role of the accountability and 
leader self-interest from the perspective of the follower. That is, we will 
investigate whether followers are able to accurately estimate when leaders are 
most likely to disapprove UFB. If this is the case, it introduces the possibility that 
this assessment makes followers engage in UFB especially in those situations 
where they feel they can get away with it.  
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4.1.1 Leader accountability 
 
Leader accountability refers to a leader’s expectation that s/he may be 
called on to justify his/her decisions and actions to others (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 
2009; De Kwaadsteniet et al., 2007; Scott and Lyman, 1968: Semin and Manstead, 
1983; Tetlock, 1992). A lack of leader accountability can be an important 
antecedent of unethical behavior in organizations (Beu & Buckley, 2001). In fact, 
when leaders do not expect to be held accountable for their decisions or actions, it 
stands to reason that the temptation will be more present to act in ways that benefit 
their own interest rather than the welfare of the common good (e.g., customers, 
society). Given the importance of this construct, it is surprising to see that 
accountability has not received extensive empirical attention in the management 
literature (Hall et al., 2004), nor in the field of psychology (Lerner & Tetlock, 
1999), particularly at the leader level.  
The reason why accountability makes people act in a more ethical manner 
relies on the idea that human beings have a strong aversion against being evaluated 
in a negative manner by others (De Cremer & Sedikides, 2008; Leary, 1996; 
Tyler, 1999). Thus, when people expect to have to justify their decisions and 
actions to others, reputational concerns are activated and people are motivated to 
display behaviors that are fair, normative and socially responsible (De Cremer & 
Van Dijk, 2009; Lerner &Tetlock, 1999). Indeed, cooperative and altruistic 
behavior is relatively high when people’s reputation is being evaluated as research 
in both (evolutionary) biology and psychology has shown (e.g., Barclay, 2004; 
Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Milinski et al., 2002; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; 
Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; Price, 2006). Important to the present paper is that 
concerns about other people’s perceptions seem particularly strong in the domain 
of morality or ethicality (Jones & Pittman, 1982; Kurzban et al., 2007) as people 
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care deeply about not being seen as an unethical or immoral person by others 
(Jordan & Monin, 2008).   
Although past research on the effects of accountability did not focus on 
leaders specifically, we argue that leaders, for whom a positive reputation is 
indispensible (Sims, 2009), should be especially concerned when having to justify 
their actions to others. After all, leaders are generally seen as representing the 
company and therefore reputational damage would hurt both their own and the 
organization’s trustworthiness. Specifically, when others (i.e., top level 
management, co-workers, accounting agency) find out that a leader has condoned 
UFB, this could damage the leader’s reputation significantly. Taken together, 
situations of high accountability will put social pressure on leaders to do the 
morally right thing which should result in showing disapproval of UFB. However, 
recent research demonstrated that accountability pressures do not always lead to 
just and moral behavior (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2009, Lerner and Tetlock, 1999; 
Sedikides et al., 2002). Rather, other motives might override the motive to 
conform to social pressures due to accountability. One such situation that might 
make accountability less successful in stimulating the disapproval of UFB is when 
the leader personally benefits from the unethical behavior displayed by the 
follower. 
 
4.1.2 Instrumentality of UFB for the leader 
 
 Self-interest is at the root of unethical behavior: individuals are more 
likely to engage in unethical behavior when there is a high payoff for engaging in 
such behavior (e.g., Carson, 2003; Grover, 1993; Moore & Loewenstein, 2004; 
Trevino, 1986). Although obviously hired to act in the interest of the company, 
leaders, like their followers, are also individuals who sometimes act in line with 
their own interests (Eisenhardt, 1989). Importantly, employees might not be the 
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only ones who benefit from engaging in unethical behavior. Rather, in 
organizations the interests of leaders (i.e., managers) and followers are often 
aligned. In fact, UFB might sometimes reveal positive implications for the 
financial or overall performance of departments, which in turn has a positive effect 
on how leaders are evaluated by their organization. Following these insights, it 
stands to reason that leaders sometimes might be less motivated to disapprove of 
UFB, particularly when they personally benefit from those unethical actions. 
 To our knowledge, no research has focused on how the alignment of 
interests between followers and leaders affect leaders’ disapproval of UFB. Some 
studies do however, implicitly suggested that leaders might be sensitive to the 
instrumentality of their followers’ unethical behavior. Supervisors have, for 
instance, been found to react less strongly to rule violation of employees who 
score high on creativity or have a high job status (Rosen & Jerdee, 1974). 
Furthermore, in several studies, Bellizzi and colleagues (e.g., Bellizzi and Hite, 
1989; Bellizzi & Hasty, 2003; Bellizzi & Bristol, 2005; Bellizzi, 2006) have 
shown that sales managers treat unethical sales behavior of their top selling agents 
more leniently than lesser selling agents’ unethical behavior. Although the 
instrumentality of UFB was not directly manipulated in these studies, top 
performing employees can be seen as instrumental to leaders as they help leaders 
to achieve their own goals or quota (DeConinck, 1992).  
Overall, these findings at least suggest that leaders are sensitive to the 
instrumentality of their followers. If this is the case, leaders may be less willing to 
show disapproval of unethical acts by valuable employees (i.e., top performing 
employees, employees with a high job status). Therefore, when UFB is 
instrumental in serving the leader’s self-interest, a leader is expected to be less 
likely to disapprove those unethical actions.  
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4.1.3 How accountability and instrumentality interact 
 
Thus far, we have argued that the likelihood that a leader will be held 
accountable as well as the extent to which UFB is instrumental to the interest of 
the leader might influence leader’s disapproval of UFB. However, in a situation in 
which UFB is instrumental to themselves, leaders nevertheless face a conflict of 
interest in which taking the morally right decision (i.e., show disapproval) is the 
direct opposite of doing what is in their own best interest (i.e., condoning UFB and 
profit from it). An important question therefore is whether accountability can be a 
successful tool in motivating leaders to put aside self-interested motives and 
display disapproval even when UFB is instrumental to their own interest.  
Recent behavioral ethics research has illustrated that the decisions and 
actions of human beings are often distorted in a self-enhancing manner (e.g., 
Chugh et al., 2005; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). In situations where there is a 
tradeoff between self-interest and morality, this self-enhancement tendency reveals 
itself by people’s engagegement in self-deception, causing the ethical colors of a 
decision to fade (ethical fading; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). These self-
enhancing processes take place in an unconscious and automatic manner, which 
leads self-interest to prevail in human decision making processes (Moore & 
Loewenstein, 2004). Consequently, people automatically act in a self-interested 
manner resulting in accepting and showing unethical behavior more easily.  
Following this line of thinking, when leaders profit themselves from UFB, 
self-interested concerns are activated, which consequently should override moral 
concerns about unethical follower acts. Therefore, self-interest salience should 
inhibit the normative and social pressures of being held accountable. That is, 
accountability might only be successful in stimulating the disapproval of leaders 
who don’t profit themselves from the UFB. As such, we expect that leaders will 
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show more disapproval of UFB when they are held accountable, but this is most 
likely the case when the UFB is not instrumental to their own interest.  
 
4.1.4 The present research 
 
We examined our predictions first in a controlled laboratory experiment 
where participants were placed in a leader position in a group and were confronted 
with an unethical act of one of their group members. Specifically, we tested the 
prediction that leaders display more disapproval against an unethical follower 
when they potentially can be held accountable, but particularly so when they do 
not benefit themselves from this UFB. 
We further designed a second study (Study 4.2) in which we look at the 
other side of the coin, by examining when followers expect their leaders to 
disapprove of their unethical behavior the most. Research shows that, followers 
often believe that leaders are driven by self-interest (Fiske, 1993; 2001), which 
induces followers to closely observe their leader’s behavior (Lind, 2001). This 
assumption that leaders are driven by selfishness may thus allow followers to an 
accurate assessment of when leaders will disapprove of UFB: When the leader 
does not personally benefit from such behavior (i.e., low instrumentality) and 
when the leader’s reputation might be on the line (i.e., high accountability), it is 
likely that such disapproval will occur. However, when the leader benefits from 
UFB, it is less likely that disapproval will occur. Demonstrating that followers are 
correct in predicting leaders’ reactions is important, because it indicates that UFB 
might not be easily rooted out. Indeed, correct predictions by followers imply that 
they can show strategic behavior and show unethical behavior serving their own 
interest in those situations where they have the best chance to get away with it.  
This focus on how followers evaluate and judge the exact conditions under 
which UFB is accepted or not by their leaders is also interesting from a theoretical 
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point of view. Specifically, this research question responds to recent claims that 
more empirical research should be done on the role of followers in the psychology 
of leadership (e.g., see Shamir, 2007 for an overview). In line with this claim, 
Study 4.2 thus examined how well followers predict leader reactions to UFB. 
 
4.2 STUDY 4.1 
 
4.2.1 Method 
 
Participants and design. One hundred and two undergraduate students at 
a Dutch university (22 males, 80 females, Mage = 19.61 SD = 2.81) participated 
voluntarily in the study, for which they were paid 7 euros ($10).  
Procedure. Participants were seated in adjacent yet soundproof cubicles, 
in which they worked on a computer during the experiment. We explained that 
they would work on a series of tasks in a 4-person group and that one individual 
would be appointed as the leader of the group. Participants were ostensibly 
assigned to either the role of group leader or regular group member based on a 
questionnaire they had answered at the start of the experiment, which ostensibly 
measured leadership skills (for a similar procedure, see Overbeck & Park, 2006). 
In reality, every participant was assigned to the leader role and led to believe that 
(s)he would supervise a group of three other individuals. Furthermore, the leader 
believed that the group members could communicate with their leader at fixed 
times during the group task. 
Next, we told the leader that the group could earn a bonus for their 
performance on the first task if they were among the two best groups of their 
session. For the first task, this would depend on the performance of one of the 
group members (i.e., group member C). We told the leader that group member C 
had to solve several mathematical problems and that the performance of this group 
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member would be rated according to the number of correct answers and the time 
used. After finishing the first task, group member C could communicate to the 
leader how (s)he had performed. While group member C was allegedly working 
on the mathematics task, the leader worked on a bogus individual task in which the 
(s)he rated the importance of several typical leader behaviors (i.e., motivating 
employees, problem solving, planning etc.). This task was added to improve the 
believability of the group experience. After finishing this task, the leader received 
the results of the mathematics task of group member C. This group member solved 
5 out of 5 problems in 148 seconds. Then the leader found out that because of this 
performance, his/her group belonged to the two best groups of the day and thus 
were entitled to a bonus (lottery tickets for an Ipod). 
Subsequently, the manipulation of instrumentality for the leader was 
introduced. Half of the leaders read that the bonus would be divided equally 
among the other three group members and that the leader would not receive any 
bonus (low instrumentality for the leader) while the other half read that the leader 
would receive the largest part of the bonus (high instrumentality for the leader). 
Thereafter, the leader accountability manipulation was introduced. Half of the 
leaders read that the communication between the leader and the group members 
was completely confidential, that none of this information would be saved and 
thus, that the information would be viewed neither by the experimenter nor the 
other participating groups (low accountability for the leader, for a similar 
procedure, see Kramer et al., 1993). The other half of the leaders read that all 
communication between the group members would be saved and might possibly 
be viewed by the other groups and the experimenter (high accountability for the 
leader).  
Thereafter, the leader received a message from group member C in which 
the group member explained that (s)he had acted unethically (i.e., cheated) in 
solving the problems. Specifically, the email read: 
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“Hey! I have to admit that these sums were rather difficult, but I found a 
paper with notes from a previous participant that had the correct answers. - So, I 
copied the answers…I finished really quickly!” 
 After reading this message, we solicited the manipulation checks and our 
measure of leader disapproval. Finally, we thanked, debriefed, and paid the 
participants. 
Measures. Participants responded to all measures on a seven-point Likert-
scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree).  
We checked for leader instrumentality with two the items including “The 
bonus will be completely divided among the other three group members [reversed 
item]” and “I will receive the largest part of the bonus”, r = .44, p < .001) 
We checked leader accountability with three items (α = .91). These items 
were “The interactions between me and my fellow group members will not be 
visible to the experimenter or the other groups [reversed item]”, “All interactions 
between me and my fellow group member will be saved and will be visible to the 
experimenter and the other groups”, and “All interactions between me and my 
fellow group members will be private [reversed item]”.  
 We measured leader disapproval of his/her follower’s behavior with two 
items.  We asked the participants to what extent they wanted to compliment group 
member C [reversed] and to what extent they disapproved of group members C’s 
performance. These two items were combined into one average disapproval score 
(α = .91).  
 
4.2.2 Results 
 
Manipulation checks. A two-way (accountability vs instrumentality) 
ANOVA on perceived instrumentality for the leader revealed a significant main 
effect of instrumentality, F(1,98) = 6,48, p < .05, showing that participants in the 
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high instrumentality condition believed more strongly they would receive the 
largest part of the bonus (M = 2.90; SD = 1.52) than participants in the low 
instrumentality condition (M = 2.26, SD = 1.15). Neither the main effect of 
accountability, F(1,98) < 1, ns, nor the interaction, F(1,98) = 2,25, p = .12 was 
significant.  
A two-way ANOVA revealed that participants in the high accountability 
condition experienced higher accountability (M = 5.42, SD = 1.51) than those in 
the low accountability condition (M = 2.69, SD = 1.48), F(1,98) = 86,29, p < .001. 
Neither the main effect of instrumentality, F(1,98) = 2.25, p = .14 nor the 
interaction, F(1,98) < 1, ns, was significant. In sum, both the instrumentality and 
accountability manipulation appear to be successfully and independently induced. 
Leader disapproval. A two-way ANOVA with leader disapproval as 
dependent variable revealed no main effect of instrumentality, F(1,98) < 1, ns, or 
accountability, F(1,98) < 1, ns. However, as hypothesized, a significant interaction 
was found, F(1,98) = 4,77, p < .05, see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1: Leader’s Disapproval of UFB by Accountability and Instrumentality (Study 4.1) 
 Low Instrumentality for 
Leader 
High Instrumentality for 
Leader 
 M SD M SD 
Low Accountability Leader 4.08 1.52 4.46 1.43 
High Accountability Leader 5.00 1.59 4.05 1.66 
N = 102 
 
Simple effects tests revealed a significant effect of accountability, but only 
in the low instrumentality condition F(1,98) = 4,64, p < .05, and not in the high 
instrumentality condition F(1,98) < 1, ns. Specifically, leaders disapproved more 
of the unethical act of their follower when they could be held accountable, but 
only when they themselves did not benefit from this unethical act of the follower.  
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Figure 4.1: The Interaction Effect of Accountability and Instrumentality on Leader 
Disapproval (Study 4.1). 
 
4.2.3 Discussion 
  
The findings from Study 4.1 provide support for our predicted interaction 
effect: Leaders disapproved more of UFB when they could be held accountable for 
their decision, but only when this UFB was not instrumental in serving the leader’s 
self-interest. To our knowledge, these findings are the first empirical evidence to 
show that leaders are not always consistent in showing disapproval of UFB. 
Specifically, it shows that accountability might not always be an effective tool in 
motivating leaders to do the morally right thing (i.e. display disapproval), 
particularly when the leader personally benefits from the UFB.  
 Importantly, these findings also illustrate that conditions exist under which 
followers more easily can get away with being unethical, consequently promoting 
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the emergence of unethical behavior in organizations. That is, leaders display less 
disapproval when instrumentality is high and/or when accountability is low. If 
followers are aware and accurate in predicting these specific conditions then the 
risk may exist that followers will act on these beliefs and thus display unethical 
behavior under those specific conditions where leaders are more likely to condone 
UFB. As a consequence, unethical behavior may even prevail in organizations. 
Therefore in Study 4.2, we wanted to examine whether followers are aware of 
those exact situations where they can get away with being unethical and those 
situations where their leader will disapprove of their unethical actions. Put 
differently, do followers correctly predict leaders’ reactions to UFB? 
 
4.3 STUDY 4.2 
 
4.3.1 Method 
 
Participants and design. Ninety-nine undergraduate students at a Dutch 
university (54 males, 45 females, Mage = 21.15 SD = 1.73) participated voluntarily 
in the study for research credits.  
Procedure. Participants were seated in adjacent yet soundproof cubicles, 
in which they were presented with a vignette situation. Specifically, all 
participants read a scenario in which they engaged in unethical behavior. 
You are working for an insurance company specialized in car insurances. 
Through a friend who works at the CBR (Centraal Bureau Rijvaardigheid; a 
Dutch agency that takes care of drivers’ licenses) you’ve gotten hold of a customer 
base with the names and addresses of individuals who have just passed their 
driver’s exam. As a consequence you are now in possession of a large list of 
potential customers that you could benefit greatly from. However, the list was 
confidential and therefore illegally obtained by you.  
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Participants then indicated the type of situation in which they anticipated 
their supervisor to disapprove of their behavior the most. We presented four 
potential situations to the participants in which we independently varied whether 
the employees’ unethical behavior was instrumental to the leader and whether the 
leader could be held accountable for the employees’ actions. Specifically, the 
leader could either benefit from the employee’s unethical behavior as it would 
increase his/her chances to obtain a bonus (i.e., high instrumentality for leader) or 
the employees unethical behavior did not affect  the leader’s chance of obtaining a 
bonus (i.e., low instrumentality for the leader). With regard to accountability of the 
leader, we varied whether there was a real possibility that a third party (i.e., a 
watchdog for insurance companies) would find out about the illegal obtainment of 
the customer base (high accountability), or whether this possibility was almost 
nonexistent (low accountability). After being presented with and choosing from 
these four situations, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
 
Table 4.2: Percentage of Followers That Believed their Unethical Act Would Result in the Most 
Leader Disapproval in Specific Situation (Study 4.2). 
 Low Instrumentality UFB for 
Leader  
High Instrumentality UFB for 
Leader  
Low Accountability for 
Leader  
8.1% 3 % 
High Accountability for 
Leader  
79.8.% 9.1 % 
N = 99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Leader Disapproval of UFB 
 
                                                                                                                 
75 
 
4.3.2 Results 
As predicted, a significant majority of participants (79.8 %, see Table 4.2 
for all percentages) believed that their leader would disapprove of their behavior 
the most when there was a chance that a third party would found out about the 
unethical act (i.e., high accountability) and when the leader could not personally 
benefit from the employees’ action (i.e., low instrumentality), χ2(3) = 159,38, p < 
.001. From this result, we can conclude that followers appear to assess accurately 
when their leader will disapprove of UFB the most. Indeed, in Study 4.1 we found 
that leaders disapproved the most of UFB in the specific situation where they 
could be held accountable and did not personally benefit from UFB. Taken 
together, our findings thus show that (a) leaders are not always consistent in taking 
proactive actions (i.e., by displaying disapproval) against unethical followers, and 
(b) that followers appear to be aware of this.  
 
4.4. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Organizational leaders play an indispensable role in influencing the ethical 
and unethical decisions and acts of their followers (Trevino et al., 2000, 2003). 
One important way through which leaders can create an ethical climate in which it 
is clear what is morally acceptable and not, is by disapproving unethical follower 
behavior (UFB; Brown & Trevino, 2006). To date, research has failed to account 
for those factors that influence when leaders actually display such disapproval. In 
the present study, we argued that accountability activates reputational concerns 
and puts social pressure on leaders to do the morally right thing, that is, to show 
disapproval of UFB. Additionally, we argued that accountability might be less 
effective in facilitating leader disapproval when the leader personally benefits 
from UFB. In this case, leaders face a conflict of interest between what’s morally 
right and what is best for their own interest. When confronted with such conflicts 
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of interest, people automatically and intuitively reason and act more in terms of 
their own interest (Chugh et al., 2005; Moore & Loewenstein, 2004; Tenbrunsel & 
Messick, 2004). For that reason, we proposed that in such conditions self-interest 
might inhibit the social pressure that accountability puts on leaders to do 
disapprove of UFB. Consequently, we hypothesized that leaders that are held 
accountable will be more likely to display disapproval of UFB, but particularly so 
when the UFB is not instrumental to the leaders’ own interest. In an experimental 
lab study we found support for this line of reasoning. To our knowledge, these 
findings provide the first empirical evidence that leaders sometimes fail to 
disapprove of UFB and inherently that conditions exist in which followers can get 
away with engaging in unethical acts.  
 Our finding that leaders are not consistent in displaying disapproval brings 
with it an interesting possibility. That is, followers might particularly engage in 
unethical acts in those situations where they are more likely to get away with it.  
For this behavior to emerge, we need to examine whether followers indeed 
understand or are aware of the specific conditions under which leaders will display 
less disapproval. Therefore, we designed a second study, which focused on 
followers’ expectations of leader disapproval. We argued that followers are 
motivated to understand the actions of their leader (Galinsky et al., 2006; Kelley, 
1972; Lind, 2001). and that followers often believe that leaders act in line with 
their self-interest (Fiske, 1993; 2001). Therefore, we argued that followers might 
accurately predict that their leader will disapprove of UFB the most when the 
leader does not personally benefit from UFB and when their leader’s reputation is 
on the line (i.e., when their leader can be held accountable). As expected, our 
findings show that followers predict correctly, and are aware of those situations 
when leaders disapprove of UFB the most. Taken together, our findings thus show 
that leaders disapprove less of UFB when they personally benefit from this 
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unethical follower act even when they can be held accountable and that followers 
are aware of this inconsistency. 
 
4.4.1 Theoretical implications 
 
The present findings contribute to the ethical leadership literature in 
several ways. First, whereas the literature on ethical leadership often focuses on 
what ethical leaders should do and why they should do this (i.e. a prescriptive 
approach), the present study examines how leaders actually react to unethical acts 
committed by their followers (a descriptive approach as advocated by the 
behavioral ethics perspective, De Cremer, 2009). By adopting such a descriptive 
approach, we also respond to recent calls for (a) more research on antecedents 
rather than consequences of leader behavior (e.g., Bommer et al., 2004; Scott et 
al., 2009) and (b) more research on the role that followers play in the psychology 
of leadership (see Shamir, 2007 for an overview).  
Furthermore, our findings show that taking an instrumental perspective on 
ethical leadership behaviors provides a fruitful research avenue. Leaders’ actions, 
just as human beings in general are sometimes affected by self-interested motives 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) and this seems particularly relevant with regard to how leaders 
respond to the unethical behavior of others. The fact that our findings show that 
leaders show less disapproval of UFB when they personally profit from it (i.e., and 
the interests of the leader and follower are thus aligned), even when they are 
socially pressured to make the morally right choice, stands testimony to the 
strength of self-interested motives. Adopting this instrumental perspective, we feel 
it is important to stress that to date, past research focusing on aligned interests of 
leaders and followers particularly focused on predicting positive behaviors such as 
cooperation, job satisfaction and organizational citizenship behavior (e.g., Conger 
& Kanungo, 1998; Settoon et al., 1996). For instance, strong follower 
On The Psychology of Displaying Ethical Leadership 
 
                                                                                                                 
78 
 
identification with the organization and trust in the leader is associated with more 
cooperative behavior (De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2004). In contrast, our 
research takes a first step in showing how the alignment of interests between 
followers and leaders can sometimes also affect negative behaviors that have 
moral consequences, like condoning UFB. 
 Our findings do not only identify instrumentality of UFB and 
accountability as important factors influencing leader’s disapproval of UFB, but 
also represent a more dynamic description of unethical behavior in organizations. 
Specifically, our research zoomed in on how leaders react to UFB and whether 
followers can anticipate upon this behavior. Our findings first of all showed when 
leaders are most likely to disapprove of UFB (Study 4.1). This is an important 
finding, because a display of disapproval indicates to followers that unethical acts 
are not tolerated which should decrease UFB in the future. At the same time our 
findings also showed that followers accurately predict when leaders will 
disapprove the most of UFB (Study 4.2). This accurate prediction introduces the 
possibility that followers might be motivated to especially engage in unethical acts 
when the likelihood of being spoken to by their leader is least likely. As such, the 
relationship between leader and followers seems clearly more dynamic than 
suggested by prior literature portraying leaders as simply influencing followers 
(rather than vice versa) (e.g., Goffee and Jones, 2001; Northouse, 2004).  
 
4.4.2 Practical implications 
 
What can organizations do to stimulate leaders’ display of disapproval 
when confronted with UFB in their ranks? First of all, organizations should be 
aware that leaders might not always act in line with the company’s interest, but 
that their behavior is sometimes influenced by their own self-interest. Moreover, 
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leaders may not always be aware that this is the case (cf. Chugh et al., 2005; 
Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004; Moore & Loewenstein, 2004).  
Furthermore, because of the way organizations are structured, leader and 
follower interests are often intertwined. An obvious solution would be to try and 
disentangle the interests of leaders and followers where possible, for instance by 
making leader bonuses independent of follower performance. However, because 
team work is pervasive in organizations, such independence is not easy to achieve. 
What may be more practical for organizations, is stressing to their managers the 
importance of displaying disapproval of UFB, for instance through training. 
Organizational leaders should be made aware that although condoning UFB might 
seem beneficial to them in the short term, this can backfire in the long term when 
unethical behavior increases and escalates in their ranks. Moreover, such training 
sessions should also educate managers about the psychological processes that 
come into play when self-interest is involved. Although some of these processes 
work automatically and unconsciously and thus are difficult to recognize, making 
leaders aware of the potential (psychological) effects should be a first step. Indeed, 
as noted by Tenbrunsel & Messick (2004, p. 234) “by confronting the tendency 
toward self-deception head on, we will be more likely to reduce its prevalence 
than if we ignore it and act if it did not exist”.  
As we mentioned in the introduction of the present paper, leaders may 
experience strong negative emotions when having to take action against 
employees and therefore might be reluctant to do so (Ball & Sims, 1991; 
Butterfield et al., 1996). Therefore, it might also be worthwhile for organizations 
to train their leaders how to take disciplinary actions (Cole & Latham, 1997). The 
purpose of such training programs should be to reduce the negativity managers 
often associate with taking action against employees and to give them the right 
tools on how to react when confronted with unwanted follower behavior. 
Specifically, it is important for leaders to take disciplinary actions in a fair manner. 
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For instance, leader’s disciplinary actions should be done privately and in a timely 
manner, the leader should explain to the unethical follower why the leader shows 
disapproval and finally, give the follower an opportunity to explain his/her actions 
(Ball et al., 1992). Taking disciplinary action in a fair manner increases acceptance 
of the punishment and has the potential to reduce most of the negative emotions 
surrounding disciplinary actions for both the followers and leaders (Ball et al., 
1992). 
 
4.4.3 Limitations and future research 
 
 It should be noted that although this research takes an innovative approach 
to examine UFB and leader’s reactions to such behavior, it is not without 
limitations. A first potential limitation is that although we proposed that self-
interest might inhibit the effect of accountability on leader disapproval of UFB, we 
did not include a direct measure for the proposed underlying psychological process 
(e.g., automatic and self-enhancing processing invoked by self-interest) that drives 
this interaction effect. To rule out alternative explanations, future research should 
include such a measure and further examine and identify the underlying processes 
of UFB and leader’s reactions to such acts. A possible way to do this could be to 
include an implicit measure such as a word completion task (for a similar 
procedure, see Karremans & Aarts, 2007) in which the accessibility of the 
construct of self-interest is measured.  
 A second limitation might be that we did not test our predicted interaction 
effect in an organizational setting. Although we present findings that are high in 
internal validity, there might be concerns about the generalizability of our 
findings. Still it has been argued that an experimental approach can be a very 
useful strategy in studying business ethics, for instance because it reduces the 
probability of evoking socially desirable responses (Trevino, 1992). It has also 
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been found that results obtained in the laboratory and the field often are very 
similar (De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2002, 2004; Locke, 1986). Nevertheless, 
it would be interesting to see whether we can replicate our findings with actual 
managers in actual organizations. 
A final potential limitation is that although we show that followers accurately 
predict when leaders will disapprove of UFB the most, we do not have evidence 
that followers will actually engage in such behavior in those situations where they 
expect the likelihood of being caught is the smallest. Examining whether 
employees are this strategic in engaging in unethical behavior should provide an 
intriguing avenue for future research. Some research indirectly suggests that this 
might be the case. First of all, as we discussed in the present paper, human beings 
are vulnerable to self-enhancing biases (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). These 
same biases should make it more likely that followers will engage in unethical 
behavior in situations that are the most beneficial for them (i.e., low risk of being 
disciplined by leader). Second, research on social dilemmas has shown that group 
members often coordinate their actions on the expected actions of others (e.g., 
Wubben et al., 2009). Taken together, this provides a starting point for studying 
unethical behavior in a dynamic two-way manner. 
 
4.4.4 Concluding remarks 
 
 The present study dealt with an important part of being an ethical leader, 
that is, to show disapproval when being confronted with unethical follower 
behavior. Our findings provide more insight in how holding leaders accountable 
and leaders’ self-interest facilitate and inhibit such leader behavior. Furthermore, 
by focusing on leader behavior and at the same time at follower expectations of 
that behavior, our research takes a first step in a more complete and dynamic 
understanding of ethical leadership.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DISCIPLINING UNETHICAL FOLLOWERS: HOW LEADERS’ 
MORAL IDENTITY AFFECTS THEIR REACTIONS TO 
COMPETENCE AND INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Following the news, one cannot help but observe the important role 
organizational leaders often play in business scandals. Not only are they held 
responsible for their own unethical actions (e.g., in the Enron case), they are also 
expected to manage the (un)ethical conduct of other organizational members 
(Trevino & Brown, 2005). Indeed, a crucial part of ethical leadership is to take 
disciplinary action when confronted with unethical follower behavior (UFB from 
now on, Brown & Trevino, 2006). Such disciplinary action communicates to 
unethical followers and to other organizational members that the behavior is 
considered unacceptable in the organization, making it less likely that the 
unethical act will recur or be copied in the future (Chonko & Hunt, 1985). In 
contrast, when leaders fail to address UFB, unethical behavior will continue to 
prevail (Hunt & Vasquez-Parraga, 1993; Offerman, 2004). Furthermore, this will 
likely lead to a sense of injustice among other employees who expect leaders to 
take action against unethical co-workers (Trevino & Ball, 1992). 
  Given the importance of leader’s disciplinary actions in managing UFB, it 
becomes important to understand what drives such leader behavior. A key factor 
that has been identified in the literature is that leaders’ disciplinary use is 
influenced by how they interpret and attribute poor or unwanted follower 
performance (e.g., Ashansky, 1989; Gioia & Sims, 1986; Green & Mitchell, 1979; 
Martinko, Harvey & Douglas., 2007; Mitchell, Green & Wood, 1981; Rosen & 
Jerdee, 1974). For instance, research has shown that the valence of the outcome 
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(Fukami & Hopkins, 1993; Rosen & Jerdee, 1974), the severity of the bad 
performance or outcome (e.g., Trahan & Steiner, 1994; Wood & Mitchell, 1981) 
and performance history of the follower (Fukami & Hopkins, 1993; Rosen & 
Jerdee, 1974) all influence how strongly and harshly leaders will punish followers. 
Thus, it is clear that leaders’ attributions about unwanted follower acts are 
important determinants of their decision to punish followers or not. However, 
research to date has not looked at how different attribution dimensions can 
influence leader reactions to UFB.  
Two important attribution dimensions on which leaders might evaluate 
UFB is whether the unethical act is the result of a competence violation or of an 
integrity violation (cf. Martijn, Spears, Van der Plight & Jakobs, 1992; Rosenberg 
& Sedlak, 1972). Accounting fraud for instance might be the result of a lack of 
understanding of the rules of the follower (i.e., lack of competence), or the result 
of an intentional pursuit for personal gain by the follower (i.e., lack of integrity). 
Interestingly, whereas the outcome might be similar regardless of the violation 
type, an integrity violation of the follower might be weighed more strongly by the 
leader (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 1989).  
We propose that whether integrity attributions loom larger in the 
execution of disciplinary actions of leaders will depend on the strength of leaders’ 
moral identity. The more leaders define themselves as being a moral person, the 
more they will probe the situation in terms of morality (Mayer, Aquino, 
Greenbaum & Kuenzi, forthcoming; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). As a result, 
leaders high in moral identity should be more motivated to punish UFB caused by 
an integrity violation. In the present study, we thus aim to test the idea that leaders 
take harsher disciplinary action against followers committing an integrity violation 
compared to a competence violation, but this effect should only be the case for 
leaders with a strong moral identity.  
 
Chapter 5: Disciplining Unethical Followers 
 
                                                                                                                 
85 
 
5.1.1 Violation type: competence versus integrity 
 
Building on attribution theory (Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967), 
research has robustly shown that the harshness of leader reactions to unwanted 
behavior or performance of followers is affected by how they attribute the cause of 
such follower actions (for overviews, see Ashansky, 2002; Martinko et al., 2007). 
Such research however,  has mainly examined the influence of poor follower 
performance rather than the UFB that we wish to address in the present study (for 
exceptions, see e.g., Bellizzi & Hasty, 2003; Bellizzi & Hite, 1989; DeConinck, 
1992). Following Jones (p. 367, 1991), we define unethical behavior as acts “that 
are either illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger community” (p. 367, Jones, 
1991). 
Zooming in on leader reactions to UFB, one factor that is highly relevant 
but has not received empirical attention yet in the area of ethical leadership is 
whether the unethical act by the follower is caused by a competence or an integrity 
violation. Indeed, competence and integrity play an important role in the way 
people evaluate others (Martijn et al., 1992; Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972), 
particularly in organizational settings (Kim, Dirks, Cooper & Ferrin, 2006). Here, 
competence is the degree to which an individual possesses the necessary technical 
and interpersonal skills for their job (Butler & Cantrell, 1984). Integrity on the 
other hand, can be defined as the degree to which individuals adhere to a set of 
principles that are considered acceptable (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995). In 
the present study we apply these two dimensions to UFB. That is, a follower can 
engage in an unethical act because of a competence violation (e.g., lack of 
understanding of organizational rules), or an integrity violation (e.g., intentionally 
cheating for personal gain). Thus, although the outcome of unethical behavior 
might be similar, the underlying cause of such behavior can differ. But, do leaders 
distinguish between competence and integrity violations when dealing with UFB? 
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Research has shown that people process positive and negative information 
on competence and integrity in a different manner (e.g., Kim et al., 2004, 2006; 
Reeder & Brewer, 1979). Specifically, people believe that highly competent 
persons can show many levels of performance depending on their motivation and 
on task or situational demands. Therefore, a single competence violation is often 
discounted as a signal of incompetence, because both incompetent and competent 
persons can sometimes perform badly in certain situations (e.g., due to a lack of 
motivation). Intriguingly, an opposite inference is made for integrity. That is, 
people intuitively expect a person with high integrity to never engage in immoral 
or unethical behavior, whereas people with low integrity can act (im)moral 
depending on the situation. Therefore, compared to a competence violation, a 
single integrity violation is highly diagnostic about a person’s character and will 
likely result in perceptions of low integrity (Kim et al., 2004, 2006; Martijn et al., 
1992; Reeder & Brewer 1979; Reeder & Coovert, 1986; Skowronski & Carlston, 
1987, 1989). 
Because negative information about integrity is more informative and 
diagnostic than negative information about competence, it follows that integrity 
violations are weighed more strongly by observers than competence violations 
(e.g., Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 1989). In support of this, Martijn et al. (1992) 
for example showed that negative traits on the integrity dimension (i.e., unreliable 
and hypocritical) are judged more negatively and given more weight than negative 
traits on the competence dimension (i.e., dull and stupid). In a similar fashion, 
Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski (1998) found that information about others’ 
integrity has a stronger influence on people’s impression formation than 
information about others’ competence.  
Although these findings concerning the competence and integrity 
dimensions have not been applied to leaders, they seem highly relevant for 
understanding how leaders evaluate and react to UFB that is the result of either a 
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competence or an integrity violation. Indeed, attribution of causality and 
responsibility of followers’ behavior has been found to play an important role in 
leaders’ reactions towards these followers (for a recent overview see Martinko et 
al., 2007), including disciplinary actions (e.g., Bellizzi, 2003; Green & Liden, 
1980; Mitchell et al., 1981). Arguably the most robust finding is that internal 
attributions (e.g., a lack of effort or motivation) rather than external attributions 
(e.g., bad luck, or situational variables) about bad follower performance led to 
harsher disciplinary actions by the leader (for an overview, see Martinko et al., 
2007). Thus, leaders have been found to take the cause of unwanted follower 
behavior into account in their reactions to such behavior. 
Based on the above, it stands to reason that a competence violation will be 
weighed less heavily and discounted more by a leader than an integrity violation. 
A single competence violation of a follower is more likely to be perceived as a 
one-off occurrence by the leader. In contrast, a single integrity violation is 
sufficient for a leader to perceive that this follower lacks integrity. Furthermore, a 
lack of integrity signals that the follower might show such unethical behavior 
again in the future. Therefore, leaders should be motivated to take disciplinary 
action against UFB that is caused by an integrity violation. Hence, we expect 
leaders to take stronger disciplinary actions against UFB that is caused by an 
integrity violation rather than a competence violation. 
At the same time, despite its importance, several studies report relatively 
low rates of discipline use of leaders against unwanted follower behavior (e.g., 
Judge & Martocchio, 1995). This observation corresponds with the idea that 
punishing others is considered to be a highly negative emotional experience (Ball 
& Sims, 1991; Butterfield, Trevino & Ball, 1996), which makes leaders somewhat 
reluctant to punish unethical followers. Moreover, leaders may vary in the 
importance they assign to morality and integrity. Indeed, research has shown that 
people vary in how central moral values are to their identity (moral identity; e.g., 
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Aquino & Reed, 2002). For this reason, we propose that whether leaders undertake 
harsher disciplinary actions against integrity violations (relative to competence 
violations) depends on the intrinsic importance leaders place on integrity 
violations. This is likely determined by leader’s moral identity. 
 
5.1.2 Moral identity 
 
 Moral identity is a relatively stable individual characteristic, which can be 
defined as “the cognitive schema a person holds about his or her moral character” 
(p. 124, Aquino et al., 2009). The more central moral identity is to ones self-
definition, the more easily this schema will be accessible and activated in 
information processing (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Moreover, people who see moral 
values as an important part of their identity are motivated to act in accordance with 
that identity (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim & Felps, 2009; Blasi, 1980, 1984, 
2004; Damon & Hart, 1992; Erikson, 1964; Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008). 
Indeed, moral identity has been argued to play a key role in the relationship 
between moral evaluations and moral behavior (e.g., Aquino, Reed, Thau & 
Freeman, 2007; Aquino & Freeman, 2009; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). The 
explanation for this is that people want to be consistent with their idea of being a 
moral person (Blasi, 1984, 2004). Hence, moral identity is regarded to be an 
important motivator for moral action (Aquino & Freeman, 2009; Blasi, 1984; 
Damon & Hart, 1992; Hardy & Carlo, 2005).   
Several studies have shown that individuals with a strong moral identity 
are more willing to engage in moral acts, such as volunteering and other charitable 
behaviors (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). In addition, they 
are less likely to engage in lying in business negotiations (Aquino et al., 2009) and 
in antisocial behaviors such as intent to injure opponents or fooling the referee 
while playing football (Sage, Kavussanu & Duda, 2006). More recently, moral 
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identity has also been linked to ethical leadership (Mayer et al., forthcoming), 
showing that the moral identity of leaders motivates them to display ethical 
leadership. Leaders with a strong moral identity can thus be considered to care 
more about making decisions that are in accordance with moral values.  
Based on these insights, we propose that the strength of leaders’ moral 
identity will act as a moderator of the relationship between violation type of UFB 
(competence versus integrity) and leaders’ disciplinary use. That is, leaders with a 
strong moral identity should be expected to evaluate a display of lack of integrity 
of a follower more negatively than leaders with a low moral identity. Moreover, 
leaders with a high, rather than a low moral identity are more motivated to act in a 
manner that is consistent with their moral schema. This should take form in how 
they respond to an integrity violation of the follower. Specifically, we expect that 
leaders will take harsher disciplinary actions against UFB when this is caused by 
an integrity violation rather than a competence violation, but this will only be the 
case for leaders with a strong moral identity . 
 
5.1.3 The present study 
 
 The aim of the present research is to examine how the type of follower 
violation (competence vs. integrity) and the moral identity of the leader predict 
disciplinary actions of the leader against UFB. Our predictions were tested across 
two experimental studies. In Study 5.1, we first manipulated moral identity using a 
priming procedure (Aquino et al., 2009). That is, although moral identity is a 
relatively stable individual characteristic, the accessibility of this moral self-
schema can also differ across situations (Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Aquino et al., 
2009). Priming moral values is one way to temporarily activate and increase the 
accessibility of individuals’ moral identity. Indeed, research has shown that doing 
so increases the influence of moral identity on behavior (Aquino et al., 2009).  
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After being primed with moral values, participants were assigned to a 
leader position in an interdependent trust game with a follower. The reason we 
chose this type of game is because it simulates the interdependent relationship 
leaders and followers have in organizations (e.g., Hollander, 1992). Indeed, 
leaders place trust in their followers, and followers can violate this trust when they 
engage in unethical behavior (Hollander, 1995). Therefore, in Study 5.1 the 
leaders were presented with the opportunity to invest 10 euros in their follower. 
The followers received this amount tripled (30 euros) and had to decide how much 
they wished to return to the leader. A cooperative choice by both parties would 
yield a positive outcome for both parties. However, against the expectations of the 
leaders their follower returned only 5 euros (i.e., violating the equal division rule). 
Moreover, we manipulated whether the follower did this intentionally (i.e., an 
integrity violation) or due to a lack of understanding of the rules (i.e., a 
competence violation).  
 In Study 5.2, we used a laboratory setting with more external validity. In 
contrast to Study 5.1 where we manipulated moral identity salience, we measured 
the dispositional moral identity of our leaders before the study. Next, participants 
engaged in an in basket task in which they had to take on the role of a plant 
manager of a painting manufacturer. They had to respond to a series of e-mails of 
co-workers concerning the everyday functioning of their company. One of these e-
mails concerned an unethical act (i.e., tax fraud) of an employee. We manipulated 
whether this act was caused either by an integrity or competence violation.  
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5.2 STUDY 5.1 
 
5.2.1 Method 
 
 Participants and design. One hundred and twelve business administration 
undergraduates from a Dutch university (60 males, 52 females, Mage = 20.32 SD = 
2.05) participated voluntarily in the study. They were randomly assigned to a 2 
(UFB violation type: competency vs integrity ) x 2 (moral identity: salient vs. not 
salient) between-subjects design. 
Procedure. On arrival, participants were placed in adjacent yet soundproof 
cubicles containing a table, a chair and a computer. All communication was done 
via the computer which participants believed to be linked to a central server. At 
the start of the experiment they were asked to first participate in a supposedly 
unrelated study. This study constituted our moral identity manipulation and was 
framed as a handwriting task (for a similar procedure, see Aquino et al, 2009; 
Study 4). This priming procedure has been successfully used in a series of recent 
studies (Aquino et al., 2007; Aquino et al., 2009; Reed, Aquino & Levy, 2007). In 
the task, half of our participants were assigned to the moral prime condition 
(salient moral identity), and the other half to the control group manipulation (not 
salient moral identity). Participants were presented with a 9x3 matrix. The first 
column of this matrix featured nine words, and participants were asked to copy 
and write down these words in the remaining two columns. In the salient moral 
identity condition, these nine words were moral traits (e.g., caring, honest, fair), 
whereas in the not salient moral identity condition the nine words presented were 
morally neutral (e.g., chair, table, kitchen). After writing each word down twice, 
participants were asked to think about the words for a moment, and then to write a 
story about themselves in which they used all nine words.  
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Upon finishing the handwriting task, participants learned that they would 
be paired with another person in the lab, with whom they would engage in a 
computer-mediated interaction task. Furthermore, they believed that one of them 
would be appointed as the leader and the other as the follower. Allocation of these 
roles would be based on their responses to a questionnaire they were required to 
fill out at the start of the experiment. This questionnaire was said to measure 
leadership skills. In reality however, every participant was appointed the leader 
position (for a similar procedure, see Hoogervorst, De Cremer & Van Dijke, 
forthcoming).  
Next, participants were provided with instructions concerning the 
interaction task. To create interdependence between leaders and followers in the 
present experiment, the interaction task consisted of a trust game (introduced by 
Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe, 1995). Indeed, in organizations, leaders and followers 
interact in a mutually dependent relationship in which trust plays an indispensable 
role. Similar to leader-follower relations in actual organizations, the trust game is a 
simple, yet concise paradigm in which both leaders and followers can have 
mutually beneficial outcomes if they cooperate with each other. However, leaders 
have to place trust in their follower (i.e., invest resources) to do the right thing as 
there is the risk that the follower decides not to cooperate with the leader (i.e., give 
little or nothing in return).  
In the trust game we designed for this study, leaders learned they would be 
allocated an amount of 10 euros which they could decide to invest in their 
follower. Leaders who did not want to invest in their follower would receive half 
of this amount (5 euros) and they would be thanked and debriefed after which the 
experiment would be terminated. However, if they did decide to invest 10 euros in 
their follower, the follower would receive this amount tripled (30 euros). The 
follower would then have to decide how much (from 0 to 30 euros) s/he would 
return to his/her leader. To further enhance interdependence between leaders and 
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follower, participants learned that they would play multiple rounds of the game. 
Finally, they were told that the leader would be the first allocator in every round.  
To check whether the rules of the interaction task were clear to 
participants, three questions were asked (sample item: “You have invested 10 
euros and your follower has decided to return half of the amount s/he received. 
How much did you get?”). An additional reason for posing these questions at this 
stage of the experiment was that we could use them as a setup for our UFB 
violation type manipulation. Specifically, half of our participants learned that their 
follower had answered all questions correctly and thus had a clear understanding 
of the interaction task at hand (setup for an integrity violation). The other half of 
our participants learned that their follower had only 1 correct answer, which made 
it doubtful whether the follower had a clear understanding of the rules (setup for a 
competence violation).  
Next, our participants had to choose whether they wanted to invest 10 
euros in their follower. All but one decided to do so, and we removed this person 
from further analyses. The amount of 10 euros that the leader invested was tripled 
and the followers supposedly received 30 euros. Within a minute they received a 
message of the amount they received in return from their follower. All participants 
received 5 euros in return. To check whether the participants read this information, 
we asked them two questions. First, we asked them to type in the amount of euros 
they had received. Second, we asked whether this was the amount they had 
expected (yes or no). All participants correctly indicated they had received 5 
euros. Furthermore, all participants also indicated that this was not the amount 
they had expected (see also, Lutz, 2001).  
After these questions, we introduced the second part of our violation type 
manipulation. The follower e-mailed a private message to the leader. In the 
competence violation condition, participants read:  
Hey, I did not really understand the rules, but I gave you 10/2 = 5 euros. 
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In contrast, in the integrity violation condition, participants read:  
Hey, I received 10 euros so I gave you 10/2 = 5 euros. 
 Note that in the competence violation condition, leaders had beforehand 
already received a message casting doubt about the follower’s understanding of 
the rules. In contrast, in the integrity violation condition they received a message 
suggesting that the follower had a clear understanding of the rules. Also, both 
messages were a clear violation of what actually happened (i.e., the follower 
received 30 euros, not 10) 
 Upon reading this information, the dependent measures of Study 5.1 were 
solicited. Participants were informed that, because of their leader role, they could 
take action against their follower. Specifically, the leaders could (a) issue a 
warning against their follower (yes or no) and (b) claim a money return from their 
follower. After they answered these questions, they were told that because of time 
constraints no further rounds would be played. Participants were thanked and 
debriefed.  
Measures. Participants responded to all measures on a seven-point Likert-
scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree).  
Manipulation checks. To assess whether our manipulation of Violation 
Type was successful, participants were asked to what extent they believed the 
other person acted intentionally. 
Dependent measures.  Two measures of leader’s disciplinary use were 
included in Study 5.1. As a first measure, participants were given the option to 
issue a warning to their follower or not. In an additional measure of disciplinary 
action, leaders were also provided with the opportunity to claim money back from 
their follower (from zero to a maximum of 25 euros). 
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5.2.2 Results 
 
Manipulation check. A two-way ANOVA on the manipulation check 
revealed that our manipulation of UFB violation type was successful. Specifically, 
a significant main effect of UFB violation type was found, F(1,108) = 18.29, p < 
.01, showing that people in the integrity violation condition believed the other 
person to have acted intentionally more than in the competence violation condition 
(Ms = 5.27 vs 4.21, SDs = 1.25 and 1.45 respectively). Neither the main effect of 
moral identity salience F(1,108) = 1.27, p = .26, nor the interaction effect was 
significant F(1,108) < 1, p = .36. 
Leader’s disciplinary use. As a first measure of leader’s use of discipline, 
participants were given the option to issue a warning to the other person or not. To 
analyze this categorical item (issue a warning: yes or no), we performed a 
hierarchical logistic regression analysis. We entered violation type and moral 
identity salience as categorical predictors, as well as the two-way interaction in 
Step 1.  
Note that logistic regression necessitates reliance on tests of odds and odds 
ratios to establish the significance of these effects. Here, an odd significantly 
larger than 1 means that issuing a warning to the unethical follower is significantly 
more likely than not  issuing a warning. In contrast, an odd significantly smaller 
than 1 signals that issuing a warning is significantly less likely than not issuing a 
warning. Furthermore, an odds ratio a/b significantly larger than 1 means that 
chances of issuing a warning are significantly larger in the a than in the b category. 
Such an odds ratio being significantly smaller than 1 means that the likelihood of 
issuing a warning is significantly smaller in the a than in the b category (see Table 
5.1 for an overview of these results). For our simple effects tests, we followed 
procedures as outlined by Jaccard (2001). 
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Table 5.1: Odds and Odds Ratios for the Effects of UFB Violation Type and Moral Identity 
Salience on Leader’s Decision to Issue a Warning in Study 5.1 
 
Moral Identity Salience 
 Not Salient 
Moral Identity 
Salient Moral 
Identity 
Not Salient/Salient  
Competence Violation 2.14# 1.00 2.14  
Integrity Violation 1.36 2.38* .57  
Competence / Integrity 1.58 .42# 3.75*  
Note: Table presents odds and odds ratios for giving a warning. * p < .05; # p < .10. 
 
At Step 1, no significant main effects of violation type and moral identity 
salience were found. However, as expected, we did find an interaction effect 
between violation type and moral identity salience, (B = -1.32, SE = .80; Wald’s F2 
(1, (N = 112)) = 2.71, p = .05, tested one-sided, Nagelkerke R2 = .04).  
 
Figure 5.1: Effects of UFB Violation Type and Moral Identity on Warning Probabilities (Study 
5.1). 
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A closer inspection of the results (see Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1) revealed 
that leaders in the moral identity salience condition were significantly more likely 
to issue a warning than not in the integrity violation condition (warning rate = .70; 
odd = 2.38; p < .05), but not in the competence violation condition (warning rate = 
.50; odd = 1.00, n.s.). Furthermore, leaders with a salient moral identity were less 
likely to issue a warning when confronted with a competence violation than when 
confronted with an integrity violation (warning rate .50 vs. .70; odds ratio = .42; p 
=.06). In contrast, leaders in the control group (i.e., the not salient moral identity 
group) were marginally more likely to issue a warning than not in the competence 
violation condition (warning rate = .68; odd = 2.14; p < .10), but not in the 
integrity violation condition (warning rate = .58; odd = 1.36, n.s.). However, 
leaders in the not salient moral identity were not significantly more nor 
significantly less likely to issue a warning when confronted with a competence 
violation than when confronted with an integrity violation (warning rate .68 vs. 
.58; odds ratio = 1.58, n.s.)  
As a second measure of disciplinary action, leaders were provided with 
the opportunity to claim money back from their follower (from zero to a maximum 
of 25 euros). In line with our hypothesis, a 2 x 2 ANOVA (UFB violation type x 
moral identity salience) revealed only a significant interaction effect, F(1,108) = 
4.58, p < .05, see Figure 5.2.  
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Figure 5.2: Interaction between UFB Violation Type and Moral Identity Salience on  Amount 
of Money reclaimed by Leader from Person B (Study 5.1) 
 
Simple effects test revealed a significant main effect of moral identity 
salience in the integrity violation condition F(1,108) = 6.34, p < .05, but not in the 
competence violation condition, F(1,108) < 1, p = .56. Specifically, leaders 
claimed more money from the follower when the unfair division was caused by an 
integrity violation of the follower than by a competence violation, but this was 
only the case for leaders with a salient moral identity. 
 
5.3 STUDY 5.2 
  
The findings of Study 5.1 provided evidence for our prediction that 
leaders distinguish between competence and integrity violations when disciplining 
unethical followers, but that this depends on leader’s moral identity. Specifically, 
leaders whose moral identity was made salient punished their follower more 
harshly (i.e., issue a warning, claiming money) when the follower’s unethical act 
was caused by an integrity violation rather than a competence violation.  
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In Study 5.1, we used a validated experimental game to elicit unethical 
behavior by the follower. That is, in a interdependent trust game the leader 
invested resources (i.e., 10 euros) in their follower. However, this follower offered 
an unexpected low return after lying about the resource to be divided (i.e., 10 
euros instead of 30 euros). Such interdependence between the actions of leaders 
and followers is an important feature of organizational life. Another crucial aspect 
of organizational life is how leaders make decisions and respond to events in their 
organization. Therefore, to make our findings more applicable to organizational 
settings, we designed Study 5.2. In this study, we build our experiment around an 
in basket exercise. Such a managerial role playing exercise has been argued to 
provide realism and external validity in studying unethical behavior, while 
maintaining the advantages of doing research in a controlled environment 
(Trevino, 1992).  
In addition, whereas we manipulated moral identity in Study 5.1, we 
measured the self-importance of moral identity in Study 5.2. The reason for this is 
that although the accessibility of moral identity can be affected across situations 
(e.g., by priming moral values as we did in Study 5.1), moral identity is also a 
rather stable individual personality variable (Aquino et al., 2009). Thus, in Study 
5.2 we want to examine if we can replicate the findings of Study 5.1 in a more 
realistic environment, using a different measure of moral identity.  
 
5.3.1 Method 
 
Participants and design. Seventy-three business administration 
undergraduates from a Dutch university (39 males, 34 females, Mage = 21.49 SD = 
1.96) participated voluntarily in the study in exchange for course credits. The 
study consisted of an UFB violation type (competence vs integrity) x moral 
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identity (continuous) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the violation type conditions. 
Procedure. On arrival, participants were placed in adjacent yet soundproof 
cubicles containing a table, a chair and a computer. All communication was via the 
computer which participants believed to be linked to a central server. At the start 
of the experiment, participants were asked to fill out some questionnaires. The first 
questionnaire was our measure of moral identity. Specifically, we used Aquino & 
Reed’s (2002) internalization subscale of their moral identity measure. This 
subscale has been found to be a robust predictor of moral attitudes and behavior 
(e.g, Aquino & Reed, 2002; Aquino et al., 2007; Detert, Trevino & Sweitzer, 
2008). In this measure, participants are presented with 9 moral adjectives (e.g., 
honest, caring and fair) that can characterize a person. Subsequently, participants 
rate on five items to what extent these 9 adjectives are an important part of their 
own identity. The second questionnaire ostensibly measured leadership skills. We 
included this second questionnaire so that we could appoint leaders based on their 
responses to this questionnaire.  
Upon entering the lab, participants believed that they would work on an in 
basket task, a test that is often used by companies in selection procedures to assess 
the suitability of applicants. In such tasks, job applicants are faced with a series of 
memo’s, emails and documents which they have to prioritize, fit into their 
schedule and respond to. We chose this task, because it provides a more realistic 
work setting to our laboratory experiment (see also Trevino, 1992; Zedeck, 1986).  
In the present experiment, participants believed that they would test a new version 
of the in basket task. In the task, they could be appointed the role of group leader 
or group member (i.e., follower). This position would be determined by their 
scores on the questionnaire that they had answered at the beginning of the 
experiment, which supposedly measured leadership skills. Similar to Study 5.1, 
every participant was assigned to the leader position.  
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Before starting with the in basket task, our participants were provided with 
instructions about the content and procedure of the task. Additionally, they were 
provided with background information concerning their role. First, they read a 
detailed description of their role (i.e., plant manager). Second, they read about 
their company (i., a paint manufacturer and seller) and how their company was 
organized. Finally, they read about who their co-workers were and what their roles 
in the organization entailed. Overall, this information was meant to create a 
realistic, meaningful and engaging setting for participants. 
Subsequently, participants received several e-mails from their co-workers 
in the company. The first e-mails that participants received were unrelated to the 
present study. We did this to get the participants acquainted with the procedure, 
but also to provide a cover story for the actual topic of study (i.e., leader’s 
response to UFB). For instance, participants received an e-mail with a proposal to 
switch to another employment agency. In this e-mail, characteristics were given 
about this new agency compared to the present agency the company used for 
hiring temporary workers. Participants were then provided with several possible 
replies to these e-mails. For every possible reply (e.g., call a meeting with the new 
agency; I want to have a meeting with our present agency to see if we can make a 
better deal), participants had to indicate the extent to which they would want to 
send these replies. Participants received several of these type of e-mails 
concerning the everyday functioning of the company. Every e-mail required a 
response from the plant manager.  
After these first e-mails, we introduced our manipulation of UFB violation 
type. This was done in the form of an e-mail that came from a co-worker from the 
financial department. We based this on the integrity vs. competence violation 
manipulation introduced by Kim et al., (2004, 2006). In the competency violation 
condition the e-mail read: 
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This week we received a tax refund that was higher than expected. I've 
discovered that one of our employees in the Finance department has made some 
mistakes in the tax forms. I think he filled out a lower turnover result because he 
was not aware of certain tax codes. How would you like to handle this? 
In contrast, participants in the integrity violation condition read: 
This week we received a tax refund that was higher than expected. I've 
discovered that one of our employees in the Finance department has made some 
mistakes in the tax forms. I think he deliberately filled out a lower turnover result. 
How would you like to handle this? 
Upon reading this information, participants were presented with our 
dependent measures. Specifically, they received several answer options ranging 
from showing disapproval to firing the employee. For every potential reply to the 
e-mail, they had to rate to what extent they were willing to send this reply. As an 
additional (behavioral) measure, they were asked whether they wanted to issue a 
formal warning against the employee (yes/no).  
Finally, participants were thanked for their participation and debriefed. 
Measures. Participants responded to all measures on a seven-point Likert-
scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree), except otherwise noted.  
Manipulation checks. To assess whether our manipulation of violation 
type was successful, participants responded to two questions. First, they rated to 
what extent they believed that the employee intentionally filled out the tax form 
wrong. Second, they rated to what extent they believed that the employee filled out 
the tax form wrongfully because this group member was not aware of tax codes? 
This second item was reversed coded, and both items were combined into an 
average scale (α = .73) for further analyses.  
Moral Identity. We measured moral identity using the 5-item 
internalization subscale from Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity measure (α 
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= .73, sample item “Being someone who has these characteristics is an important 
part of who I am”). 
Dependent measures. We measured leader’s disciplinary use with 5 items 
inspired by the work of Mitchell et al. (1981). Items included “I plan to suspend 
this employee.”, “I plan to fire this employee”, “I want to give this employee a 
talking to.”, “I want to show my disapproval of the employee’s behavior.”, “I want 
to issue a firm warning against this employee.”. We combined these items into an 
average disciplinary use scale (α = .76) for further analyses. In addition, 
participants had to indicate whether they wanted to issue a formal warning to the 
follower (yes/no question). 
 
5.3.2 Results 
 
Manipulation checks. A one way ANOVA revealed that our manipulation 
of UFB violation type was successful. Indeed, a significant main effect of 
violation type was found, F(1,71) = 78.22, p < .001, showing that participants in 
the integrity violation condition felt more strongly that the employee had acted 
intentionally than participants in the competence violation condition (Ms = 4.16 vs 
2.28, SDs = 1.03 and .78 respectively).  
To analyze leader’s disciplinary use, we centered leader’s moral identity 
by subtracting the means before the analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). We effect-
coded the violation type variable by assigning the value -1 to the competence 
violation condition and the value 1 to the integrity violation condition. 
Subsequently, we conducted hierarchical regression analyses to test the main 
effects (Step 1) and interaction effect (Step 2) of moral identity and UFB violation 
type on leader’s use of discipline. We refer to Table 5.2 for the regression results. 
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Table 5.2:Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Leader’s Use of Discipline on UFB 
Violation Type and Moral Identity (Study 5.2) 
 β R2 Adj R2 R2 change df 
Step 1  .08 .05 .08 2, 70 
UFB Violation Type .24*     
Leader’s Moral Identity .11     
Step 2  .20 .17 .13 3, 69 
UFB Violation Type .23*     
Leader’s Moral Identity .20     
UFB Violation Type x 
Leader’s Moral Identity 
.36**     
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
The analyses revealed a significant positive effect of violation type and 
leader’s disciplinary use (β = .23, p < .05), and a marginally significant positive 
effect of moral identity (β = .20, p = .08). Importantly, a significant interaction 
effect was also found (β = .36, p < .01, see Figure 5.3). Simple slopes analyses 
(Aiken and West, 1991) revealed that, as expected, for leaders with a high moral 
identity (1 SD above the mean), an integrity violation was more likely to result in 
disciplinary measures of the leader than a competence violation (β = .60, p < .001). 
In contrast, when leader’s moral identity was low (1 SD below the mean), integrity 
and competence violations were equally likely to result in disciplinary measures (β 
= -.14, p = .39). 
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Figure 5.3: Interaction between UFB Violation Type and Moral Identity on  Leader’s Use of 
Discipline (Study 5.2) 
 
As an additional measure, participants were also given the option to give 
the unethical employee a formal warning or not. To analyze the result of this 
categorical item, we performed a logistic regression analysis using a similar 
procedure to Study 5.1 with one main difference. This time, violation type was 
entered as a categorical predictor, but moral identity as a continuous predictor. 
Similar to Study 5.1, the results only revealed a significant interaction between 
violation type and moral identity (B = -1.40, SE = .70; Wald’s F2 (1, (N = 73)) = 
4.03, p = .05, Nagelkerke R2 = .11).  
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Table 5.3: Odds and Odds Ratios for the Effects of UFB Violation Type and Moral Identity on 
Leader’s Decision to Issue a Formal Warning in Study 5.2 
Moral Identity 
 Low High Low/High  
Competence Violation 1.55 .45# 3.44*  
Integrity Violation .95 2.37* .40*  
Competence / Integrity 1.63 .19* .25*  
Notes: Table presents odds and odds ratios for giving a formal warning. * p < .05; # p < .10.  
 
A closer inspection of the results (see  Figure 5.4, and Table 5.3) revealed that, in 
line with our expectations, leaders with a high moral identity were significantly 
more likely to issue a formal warning than not in the integrity violation condition 
(warning rate = .70; odd = 2.38; p < .05). In the competence violation condition 
they were (marginally) significant more likely to not issue a warning (warning rate 
= .31; odd = .45, p< .10). Furthermore, high moral identity leaders were 
significantly more likely to issue a warning in the integrity violation condition 
than in the competence violation condition (warning rate .70 vs .31; odds ratio = 
.19; p < .05). No significant effects of violation type were found for leaders with a 
low moral identity, confirming our hypotheses.  
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Figure 5.4. Effects of UFB Violation Type and Moral Identity on Formal Warning 
Probabilities (Study 5.2). 
 
 
5.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 Given the recent attention for ethics in society as well as in organizations, 
it becomes important to examine those factors that affect whether leaders 
consistently take action against unethical followers. In the present study, we 
examined leaders’ disciplinary reactions to unethical follower behavior (UFB) that 
is caused by either a competence violation or an integrity violation by the 
follower. We predicted that leaders might weigh integrity violations more 
strongly, because such violations are more diagnostic about the follower’s 
character than competence violations (e.g., Kim et al., 2004, 2006; Reeder & 
Brewer 1979). Consequently, the likelihood of recurrent unethical behavior by 
followers may be higher for integrity violations. Leaders, however, may differ in 
the way they assign importance to morality versus integrity issues. Specifically, 
we argued that whether leaders take stronger action against integrity violations 
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might depend on their moral identity (i.e., how central moral values are to their 
identity; Aquino & Reed, 2002). Across two experimental studies we found 
evidence for this line of reasoning: leaders took stronger disciplinary action 
against integrity violations compared to competence violations, but this was only 
the case for leaders with a strong moral identity. 
 
5.4.1 Theoretical implications  
 
The present study contributes in several ways to the existing literature. 
First of all, our research contributes to a more descriptive approach of ethical 
leadership research (Brown, Trevino & Harrison, 2005). The literature on ethical 
leadership has often focused on what ethical leaders should do and why they 
should do this (i.e. a normative approach). For instance, past research has revealed 
that leaders should consistently take action against unethical acts of followers 
(Brown & Trevino, 2006; Hunt & Vasquez-Parraga, 1993; Offerman, 2004). 
Recently, it has been advocated that research on ethical leadership should also 
focus on what leaders actually do and what the underlying motives for these 
actions are (i.e., a behavioral ethics approach; e.g., De Cremer, Mayer & 
Schminke, 2010; De Cremer, Tenbrunsel & Van Dijke, 2011). Our study fits in 
well with this behavioral ethics approach. In doing so, it is among the first to 
actually identify and examine factors that determine leaders reactions to UFB.  
By examining antecedents rather than consequences of leader’s 
disciplinary use, our research also contributes to the literature on punishments. 
Indeed, research on determinants of the use of discipline by leaders has received 
far less attention than research on the effects of such behavior (e.g., Podsakoff, 
1982, Podsakoff, Bommer, Podsakoff & Mackenzie, 2006). Furthermore, those 
antecedents that were examined mainly focused on the poor performance of 
followers rather than unethical acts (Podsakoff, 1982; for exceptions, see Belizzi, 
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1989, 2003; Hoogervorst et al., 2011). Our research provides insights on how 
leaders react to UFB. That is, our findings reveal that the cause of and unethical 
act (i.e., a competence or integrity violation) and characteristics of the leader (i.e., 
moral identity) interactively affect leaders’ reactions to UFB. 
Finally, our findings contribute to the moral identity literature. Although it 
has been theorized that moral identity should affect the moral behavior of leader 
figures in organizations (Aquino & Freeman, 2009), most research has focused on 
individuals in general rather than leaders (Aquino & Freeman, 2009; Aquino & 
Reed, 2002; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Reed & Aquino, 
2003). Research that has actually examined the role of moral identity on leader 
behaviors has only recently surfaced and is still very limited (Aquino et al., 2009; 
Mayer et al., forthcoming; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). Our findings provide 
additional evidence for the important role that moral identity plays in leaders 
making the morally appropriate decision (i.e., taking action against UFB). 
Interestingly, past research has suggested that leaders might be somewhat reluctant 
to engage in punishment behaviors (Butterfield et al., 1996). Indeed, taking action 
against their followers arguably remains a highly aversive experience for leaders. 
Our finding that high moral integrity (relative to low moral identity) leaders take 
harsher action against integrity violations suggests that moral identity might make 
leaders less reluctant to engage in punishment behaviors.  
 
5.4.2 Practical implications 
 
 Our findings also have practical implications. Compared to leaders with a 
low moral identity, those with a high moral identity were more likely to do the 
morally right thing by taking harsher action against integrity violations compared 
to competence violations. Organizations should thus benefit from increasing the 
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moral identity of leaders in their organization, but how can they achieve this in 
practice? 
 One obvious way through which leader moral identity can be stimulated in 
the organization is through selecting and hiring managers for whom moral values 
are central to their identity. Indeed, as argued by Reynolds & Ceranic (p. 1623, 
2007) when “the organization employs individuals with strong moral identities, 
moral behavior is likely to follow”. At the same time, we argue that organizations 
should not limit themselves to such employee selection strategies. Our findings 
suggest that making moral identity salient can also lead to more moral behavior. 
Thus, organizations might also benefit by creating an organizational culture in 
which moral values are valued, rewarded and encouraged (Aquino & Freeman, 
2009; Aquino et al., 2009; Mayer et al., forthcoming). Such an approach should 
stimulate development of employees’ moral identities as well as make these moral 
identities more accessible (Aquino et al., 2009; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). In 
turn, the extent to which moral identity is made accessible should positively affect 
moral outcomes (Aquino et al., 2007). 
 
5.4.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
 
 It has to be noted that the present research is not without its limitations. 
One concern might be that we tested our predictions in laboratory settings rather 
than in an actual organizational setting. However, as outlined by Trevino (1992), 
there are several difficulties with studying unethical behavior in organizations. For 
instance, it is a phenomenon that happens rather infrequently and when it does, 
people will likely want to conceal it. Additionally, it is a topic that often attracts 
socially desirable answers from participants. Therefore, following comments by 
Trevino (1992) and Zedeck (1986), we designed Study 5.2 as an in basket task. 
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This task is well suited to simulate the daily routine of managers in actual work 
settings.  
We took several measures to reduce concerns about social desirable 
answers in the in basket task. For instance, our participants (i.e., business students) 
believed that they were going to test a new version of the task for an outside 
assessment centre rather than work on an experiment of a professor. In fact, after 
finishing the experiment, several participants spontaneously approached the 
experimenter with tips on how to improve the task. Furthermore, the participants 
had to respond to many items that were related to running a daily business but 
unrelated to the topic of the present study (UFB). During the debriefing session, 
participants indicated that they did not suspect that the experiment was about 
unethical behavior specifically. Taken together, we believe that by providing a 
realistic experimental setting we addressed concerns about the validity of our 
results. Still, future studies should also focus on studying this matter using actual 
managers from actual organizations. 
 Our finding that competence violations are punished less severely could 
imply that leaders have a different goal when punishing competence violations 
relative to integrity violations. Indeed, research has found that leaders take less 
severe disciplinary actions when their intention is to motivate their followers to 
perform better (Arvey & Jones, 1985; Trahan & Steiner, 1994). Unfortunately, we 
did not measure such underlying intentions in the present research. This provides 
an interesting avenue for future research to address. For instance, it would be 
interesting to find out if leaders have different goals and use different types of 
discipline for the two violation types. A possible way to achieve this would be to 
also give leaders the option of disciplinary actions that focus on improving 
follower competence, such as training programs.  
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5.4.4 Concluding remarks 
 
Fueled by the financial crisis and many ethical scandals in recent years, 
the need for ethical leadership now seems higher than ever. Naturally, research has 
mainly focused on the normative aspect of this leadership style, suggesting what 
leaders should do and say. However, ethical scandals often show that leaders do 
not always make the morally right decisions. Therefore, it becomes important to 
gain more insight in the ethical decision making processes of leaders by 
identifying and examining the underlying motives and determinants of ethical 
leader behaviors. The aim of the present study was to contribute to a more 
descriptive approach to studying ethical leadership. By examining how leaders 
react to unethical followers we hope to contribute to a more complete 
understanding of how and when leaders do the right things.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 Given the shocking amount of ethical scandals in business, government, 
sports and religious organizations in the last decade, it is not surprising that the 
issue of ethics has taken a prominent role in the research agenda of social 
scientists. Obviously, leaders play a crucial role in how business ethics becomes 
part of the organizational culture. Not only are they the face of their respective 
companies and thus often held responsible by the public and the Law when 
something goes awry, they should also provide ethical guidance to others in their 
organization. Indeed, research has shown that when leaders are perceived as 
ethical, they positively influence ethical conduct on the work floor (Brown & 
Trevino, 2006; Trevino et al., 1999). Moreover, ethical leadership has also proven 
to be an effective leadership style (De Hoogh & Den Hartog, 2008; Rhode, 2006) 
and is found to stimulate desirable work outcomes, such as follower motivation, 
organizational citizenship behaviors and job performance (Piccolo, Greenbaum, 
Den Hartog & Folger, 2010). 
 Although it is clear that it is important for society and organizations that 
leaders are ethical, little empirical work has been conducted to examine 
antecedents of ethical leader behavior. In this dissertation, I addressed this gap in 
the literature by identifying and examining the interactive effects of leader motives 
and dispositions, the motives (and actions) of followers and situational factors on 
several ethical leader behaviors. In doing so, I focused on antecedents of the three 
most important aspects of ethical leadership (i.e., being a role model, acting fairly 
and punishing unethical follower behavior). Specifically, I addressed the following 
three research questions: Firstly, when are leaders willing to act as a positive role 
model by going beyond their self-interest (i.e., be self-sacrifical)? Secondly, when 
do leaders treat their employees in a fair manner? Thirdly, when do leaders take 
On The Psychology of Displaying Ethical Leadership 
 
                                                                                                                 
114 
 
proactive disciplinary actions when confronted with unethical follower behavior in 
their organization? 
 In this chapter, I will first provide a summarized overview of the findings 
of the empirical chapters 2 through 5. Subsequently, I will discuss what the 
contributions and implications are of these findings. Finally, I will discuss the 
strengths and limitations of my research and will provide some suggestions for 
future studies. 
 
6.1 SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 The aim of Chapter 2 was to identify and examine antecedents of leaders’ 
self-sacrificial behavior. Engaging in such behavior contributes to follower 
perceptions of leaders as effective and attractive role models (e.g., Choi & Mai-
Dalton, 1999; Yorges et al., 1999). Consequently, self-sacrificial leaders elicit 
more positive affect, trust, cooperation, and improved performance among their 
followers (De Cremer, 2006; Van Knippenberg & Van Knippenberg, 2005). 
 In Chapter 2, I argued that leader self-sacrifice might be influenced by 
leader’s sense of belonging and sense of power. First of all, because leaders are 
members of the group they lead, feeling included in their social collective is likely 
an important concern to them (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Moreover, 
research has shown that feeling included makes people more willing to engage in 
prosocial behaviors while feeling excluded results in less prosocial behavior (e.g., 
Twenge et al., 2007). Therefore, I expected that leaders who feel included might 
be more willing to self-sacrifice than leaders who feel excluded by their group. At 
the same time, it is important to note that leaders of course also are unique 
members of their groups because they have power over resources and the power to 
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influence others in their group. Therefore, leader self-sacrifice might also be 
influenced by the extent to which leaders feel powerful (i.e., subjective sense of 
power). Following recent insights in the power literature, I propose that feeling 
powerful (i.e., have a high subjective sense of power) might function as a 
substitute for the positive effect of sense of belonging on self-sacrifice. That is, 
leaders high in sense of power might already be motivated to contribute to the 
goals of the organization (e.g., Overbeck & Park, 2006) and are thus more likely to 
engage in self-sacrificial behavior when the job asks for it. In contrast, those low 
in sense of power have been found to be affected more by situational constraints 
and social pressures (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2008). Therefore, I predicted an 
interaction effect such that for leaders low in sense of power, there will be a 
positive relation between sense of belonging and leader self-sacrifice, whereas this 
relationship will be attenuated when leaders are high in sense of power.   
 I tested this predicted interaction effect across three studies. First, in an 
experimental laboratory setting (Study 2.1) participants were placed in a leader 
position in which they believed to be the leader of a group that would engage in a 
brainstorming task. Leader’s sense of power was manipulated through a power 
priming procedure (based on Galinsky et al., 2003). The leader had to write a short 
story about a situation in which s/he had control over (an)other person(s) (inducing 
high sense of power) or a situation in which (an)other person(s) had control over 
him/her (inducing low sense of power). Subsequently, leader’s sense of belonging 
was manipulated by letting the leader overhear his/her group gossip either strongly 
positive or negative about him/her. Before the end of the experiment, I provided 
the leaders with the opportunity to engage in several self-sacrificial behaviors (i.e., 
giving up part of their financial bonus, investing their own time) and measured 
whether they were willing to do so. The results confirmed my hypothesis that 
leaders are more willing to self-sacrifice when they feel included, but that this is 
only the case for leaders that feel low in sense of power. 
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 To address concerns about external validity, two additional field studies 
were conducted to examine the interaction hypothesis in an organizational setting. 
In Study 2.2, leader figures from a wide range of organizations in the Netherlands 
rated the extent to which they felt included, their sense of power and the extent to 
which they were willing to engage in self-sacrificial behavior. Whereas Study 2.2 
was a single source study, in Study 2.3 I applied a multisource design using 
employees from the United States of America. Again, leaders rated the extent to 
which they felt included as well as their sense of power. However, this time 
leader’s self-sacrifice was reported by a focal employee. Both organizational 
studies replicated the findings of Study 2.1. 
 The findings of Chapter 2 therefore provide robust evidence for the role 
that power and belonging motives play in leaders’ willingness to engage in risky 
and costly behavior that others benefit from (i.e., self-sacrifice). When leaders feel 
low in sense of power, feeling included facilitates self-sacrificial behavior. 
However, when leaders feel high in sense of power they are willing to self-
sacrifice regardless of their social inclusion in their group. 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 In Chapter 2, I showed that the belonging and power leader motives of 
leaders influence their willingness to go beyond their self-interest. Putting aside 
self-interest can be seen as an ethical act in itself. After all, self-interest is often at 
the root of unethical behavior (e.g., Carson, 2003; Grover, 1993; Moore & 
Loewenstein, 2004). Importantly, it also contributes to leaders being perceived as 
attractive and credible role models by their employees. In Chapter 3, I again 
focused on an ethical leader behavior that contributes to leaders being attractive 
role models, but that can also be regarded as ethical in itself. That is, my specific 
aim in this chapter was to identify antecedents of the procedural fairness 
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enactment of leaders. 
 Procedural fairness (i.e., the perceived fairness of decision making 
procedures; Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975) plays an important role in 
organizations and society. For instance, when they perceive procedures enacted by 
authority figures to be fair, people have been found to show more cooperative 
employee behaviors such as organizational citizenship behavior (De Cremer & 
Van Knippenberg., 2002, 2003) and increased in-role performance (Zapata-Phelan 
et al., 2009). In contrast, when people experience such procedures to be unfair, 
they are more likely to engage in negative and unethical acts (e.g., Aquino, Tripp, 
& Bies, 2001; Greenberg, 1993; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). 
 Explanatory theories of fairness effects have identified people’s need for 
control and need to belong as important motives for caring strongly about fairness 
(e.g., Cropanzano et al., 2001). In Chapter 3, I took a reversed approach to these  
motives by examining whether leaders adapt their fairness enactment to the 
strength of follower control and belongingness needs. I reasoned that leadership on 
the one hand deals with directing followers towards the goals of the organization 
(e.g., Yukl & Van Fleet, 1992). However, at the same time, leaders have an 
interdependent relationship with their followers in which influence flows both 
ways (e.g., Hollander, 1992). Thus, leaders arguably are motivated to balance the 
needs of their followers with what is in the best interest for their organization. As a 
consequence, leaders might be willing to give control to followers who desire this, 
but only to followers who they believe also desire to contribute and be a part of the 
organization (i.e., have a high need to belong). Put differently, I expected leader to 
enact procedures fairly especially when interacting with a follower with a strong 
control and a strong belongingness need. I tested this hypothesis across two 
studies. 
 First, in a similar manner to Study 2.1., participants were placed in a 
leader position in Study 3.1. In this experiment, participants performed a group 
On The Psychology of Displaying Ethical Leadership 
 
                                                                                                                 
118 
 
version of an in basket task in which they had to prioritize and respond to 
information and distribute tasks. The strength of follower control need (low vs. 
high) and belongingness need (low vs. high) was manipulated by providing the 
leaders with a psychological analysis of questionnaires one of their followers had 
supposedly filled out at the start of the experiment. Upon reading this information, 
the leaders were introduced to the dependent measures. Several items measured to 
what extent leaders were willing to enact fair procedures in decision making 
processes concerning the particular follower. Additionally, leaders had to indicate 
in how many of a total of 10 procedures they wanted to grant voice to the follower. 
Both measures revealed a similar outcome. In line with my hypothesis, leaders 
enacted procedures most fairly when interacting with a follower with both a strong 
control and a strong belongingness need, compared to when one or both of these 
needs were low. 
 To address concerns about the generalizability of my findings, I conducted 
Study 3.2., in which I employed a multisource design to an organizational setting. 
Leaders from a research panel of Dutch employees rated the control and 
belongingness need of a focal employee, and in turn, these focal employees rated 
the procedural fairness enactment of their leaders. The findings of this field study 
were consistent with those of Study 3.2.  
To summarize, whereas control and belongingness concern have been 
identified in the literature to explain why people value being treated fairly (e.g., 
Cropanzano et al., 2001), Chapter 3 reveals that leaders actually adapt their 
procedural fairness enactment to these needs. That is, leaders grant voice to 
followers who desire to have control, but only when they sense that followers also 
want to be a part of the organization (i.e., have a high belongingness need).   
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Chapter 4 
 
 Whereas Chapters 2 and 3 dealt with the issue of when leaders set the 
right example (Chapter 2) and whether they treat their employees fairly (Chapter 
3), the aim of Chapter 4 was to gain more insight in how leaders deal with 
unethical behavior of their followers. To ensure that unethical behavior does not 
prevail or escalate in their organization, it is important that leaders take proactive 
actions when confronted with such behavior (Chonko and Hunt, 1985; Offerman, 
2004). However, taking such action is arguably an emotional, sometimes even an 
aversive experience for leaders (Ball and Sims, 1991; Butterfield et al., 1996). 
Moreover, leaders sometimes benefit from unethical follower behavior (UFB). For 
instance, they may receive a bonus because of a high sales performance obtained 
by a follower who used unethical sale tactics. This begs the question whether 
leaders will take action against a follower when the leader personally benefits 
from the follower’s unethical behavior.  
 To promote the incidence that leaders do the morally right thing (i.e., 
show disapproval of UFB), organizations often turn to holding leaders accountable 
(i.e., having leaders justify their actions to others; Lerner and Tetlock, 1999; 
Lindsay et al., 1996). The aim of Chapter 4 was to examine whether such social 
pressures on the leader (i.e., accountability) to do the normative and morally right 
thing (i.e., show disapproval of UFB) will prevail when UFB is instrumental to the 
leader (i.e., in the leader’s self-interest). Although research has shown that 
accountability makes people behave more in socially responsible and normative 
ways, I argued that when self-interest comes into play, these effects of 
accountability might be inhibited. Indeed, when UFB is instrumental to the leader, 
it creates a conflict of interest for leaders between what is the morally right thing 
to do (i.e, show disapproval) and what is best for the leader’s self-interest (i.e., 
condoning UFB and profit from it). Importantly, in situations where there is a 
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tradeoff between self-interest and morality, people often engage in self-enhancing 
processing such as self-deception, causing the ethical colors of a decision to fade 
(ethical fading; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). These self-enhancing processes 
take place in an unconscious and automatic manner, which leads self-interest to 
prevail in human decision making processes (Moore & Loewenstein, 2004). 
Following these insights, self-interest salience should inhibit the normative and 
social pressures of being held accountable. Therefore, I hypothesized that leaders 
will show more disapproval of UFB when they are held accountable, but that this 
would be most likely the case when the UFB is not instrumental to their own 
interest (i.e., when they do not personally benefit from the UFB).  
 I tested this hypothesis in a laboratory setting in Study 4.1. Using a similar 
procedure to Study 2.1 (and 3.1), participants were placed in a leader position and 
led to believe that they supervised a group of followers. After some initial 
instructions, they were told that one of their followers had to do a mathematical 
task and that they could receive a bonus if their follower performed well on the 
task. When this supposed follower finished the task, the leader found out that the 
follower did extremely well, finishing in the top two of all participants, resulting in 
a bonus for the group. Next, the manipulation of the instrumentality of the UFB 
was introduced: half of the leaders read that they would get the majority of the 
bonus (high instrumentality for the leader). In contrast, the other half read that the 
bonus would be divided among the followers, but that the leader would not receive 
anything from the bonus (low instrumentality for the leader). Subsequently, the 
accountability manipulation was introduced: half of the leaders read that the 
communication between the leader and the group members was completely 
confidential (low accountability). The other half of the leaders read that all 
communication between the group members would be saved and potentially could 
be viewed by the other groups and the experimenter (high accountability for the 
leader). Upon reading this information, the leader received an e-mail from the 
Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
                                                                                                                 
121 
 
follower in which s/he stated that s/he cheated on the task. Specifically, the 
follower explained that s/he had copied the results of a piece of paper a previous 
participant had left in the cubicle. After reading this e-mail, leaders found out that 
their group finished in the top two and thus would receive a bonus. Finally, I 
solicited the measure of leader disapproval. 
 Study 4.1 confirmed my hypothesis. Leaders were more willing to show 
disapproval of UFB when they could be held accountable than when they were not 
held accountable. However this was only the case when the UFB was not 
instrumental to the leader. These findings thus show that accountability might not 
always be effective in motivating leaders to make the morally right decision, 
particularly when leader’s self-interest is salient. An important implication of these 
findings is that conditions exist under which followers more easily can get away 
with being unethical without being called upon by their leader. If followers are 
aware and accurate in predicting these specific conditions, then the risk may exist 
that followers will act on these beliefs and thus display unethical behavior under 
those specific conditions where leaders are more likely to condone UFB. 
Therefore, I conducted Study 4.2 to test whether followers correctly predict 
leaders’ reactions to UFB. The results of this additional study show that followers 
in fact do so. They appear to be aware that they are most likely to get away with 
being unethical when their leader benefits from the UFB and is not held 
accountable.  
 Taken together, the findings of Chapter 4 provide the first empirical 
evidence that leaders sometimes fail to disapprove of UFB. As such, conditions 
exist under which followers can get away with engaging in unethical acts. 
Interestingly, followers actually seem to be able predict those conditions correctly. 
This introduces the possibility that followers might especially engage in unethical 
behavior in those conditions.  
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Chapter 5 
 
 In Chapter 4, I showed how the instrumentality of UFB and the 
opportunity that leaders are held accountable interactively affect whether leaders 
display disapproval of UFB. The findings in Chapter 4 suggest that the 
consequence of UFB for the leader is an important determinant in leaders’ 
decision to display disapproval of UFB. Indeed, when leaders personally benefit 
from the unethical act, they are less likely to show disapproval of such an act. In 
Chapter 5, I argued that the cause of UFB might also be an important determinant 
of leaders’ proactive actions (i.e., punishment) against unethical follower. Indeed, 
looking at past research on determinants of leader’s disciplinary use, we see that 
attribution processes play an important role. Specifically, when leaders are 
confronted with unwanted follower behavior, they are motivated to understand 
what caused this behavior. In turn, the causal attributions that leaders make, affects 
the severity of their disciplinary use (for recent overviews, see Ashansky, 2002; 
Martinko et al., 2007). However, research on disciplinary use of leaders has 
mainly focused on poor follower performance in general, rather than on unethical 
behavior specifically.  
Zooming in on potential causes of UFB, two dimensions that seem highly 
relevant to unethical behavior in organizations are competence and integrity (Kim 
et al., 2006). Indeed, a follower might act unethically due to a lack of 
understanding of the rules (i.e., a competence violation) or intentionally for 
personal gain (i.e., an integrity violation). Integrity violations have been found to 
be more diagnostic about the violator’s character than competence violations 
(Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 1989). This implies that 
the likelihood of recurrent unethical behavior is bigger for followers who made an 
integrity violation. Consequently, leaders might weigh integrity violations more 
strongly and consequently take harsher disciplinary actions against such violations 
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compared to competence violations. 
At the same time, leaders can vary in the importance they assign to 
morality in their environment. Indeed, the more leaders define themselves as being 
a moral person, the more they will probe the situation in terms of morality (Mayer, 
et al., 2011; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). Leaders with a strong moral identity 
should therefore be expected to evaluate a lack of integrity display of a follower 
more negatively than leaders with a low moral identity. Additionally, high moral 
identity leaders will be motivated to act in accordance with their moral values. 
Therefore, I formulated the hypothesis that leaders will take harsher disciplinary 
actions against UFB when this is caused by an integrity violation rather than a 
competence violation, but this will only be the case for leaders with a strong moral 
identity. 
 I tested this hypothesis across two laboratory experiments. In Study 5.1, I 
first manipulated moral identity salience. Participants were presented with nine 
words and were asked to copy and write down these words. In the salient moral 
identity condition, these nine words were moral traits (e.g., caring, honest, fair), 
whereas in the not salient moral identity condition the nine words presented were 
morally neutral (e.g., chair, table, kitchen). In addition to copying them, 
participants were asked to think about the words for a moment, and then to write a 
story about themselves in which they used all nine words.  
Next, participants were appointed to a leader position in a dyadic trust 
game. I opted to use such a game, because it entails the trust and interdependence 
that also symbolizes leader-follower relations in actual organizations (e.g., 
Hollander, 1992). The trust game is a simple, yet concise paradigm in which both 
leaders and followers can have mutually beneficial outcomes if they cooperate 
with each other. However, leaders have to place trust in their follower (i.e., invest 
resources) to do the right thing as there is the risk that the follower decides not to 
cooperate with the leader (i.e., give little or nothing in return). In this specific 
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version of the the game leaders invested 10 euros in their follower. The follower 
would receive this amount tripled (30 euros) and had to decide how much they 
wanted to return to the leader. The follower then offered an unexpected low return 
(5 euros) after lying about the resource to be divided (i.e., 10 euros instead of 30 
euros). I manipulated whether the follower had a clear understanding of the rules 
(i.e., which implied an integrity violation) or not (i.e., which implied a competence 
violation). As potential disciplinary actions, leaders were then provided with an 
opportunity to issue a warning against their follower and to claim money back 
from the follower. 
Study 5.1 provides support for my hypothesis. Leaders took harsher 
disciplinary action against integrity violations compared to competence violations, 
but this was only the case for leaders with a high moral identity. To make my 
findings more applicable to organizational settings, I designed Study 5.2, which 
was built around an in basket exercise. This managerial role playing exercise was 
designed to provide realism and external validity in studying unethical behavior, 
while still maintaining the advantages of doing research in a controlled 
environment (Trevino, 1992). In the task, participants were provided with detailed 
background information about their role (i.e., plant manager), their company and 
their co-workers. Subsequently, they received several e-mails that required their 
response concerning the everyday functioning of the company. In addition, 
whereas I manipulated moral identity in Study 5.1, I measured the self-importance 
of moral identity in Study 5.2. The reason for this is that although the accessibility 
of moral identity can be affected across situations (e.g., by priming moral values 
as we did in Study 5.1), moral identity is also a rather stable individual personality 
variable (Aquino et al., 2009).  
One of the e-mails the leaders received concerned an employee who had 
committed tax fraud. I manipulated whether the employee had done so 
intentionally (i.e., an integrity violation), or because of a lack of understanding of 
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tax codes (i.e., a competence violation). The leaders were presented with several 
possible actions (e.g., suspend the employee, show disapproval, give the employee 
a talking to), and had to indicate the extent to which they wanted to take such 
action. In addition, they could choose to issue a formal warning against the 
employee. The results of Study 5.2 were in line with those of Study 5.1. 
Taken together, Chapter 5 reveals that leaders take harsher disciplinary 
actions against UFB that is caused by an integrity violation rather than a 
competence violation. However, this effect was only found for leaders with a 
strong moral identity. These findings are in line with previous research that has 
shown that the attributions and evaluations that leaders make about unwanted 
follower performance are important determinants of their use of punishments (for 
overviews, see Ashansky, 2002; Martinko et al., 2007). I show that this is also the 
case for unethical follower acts. Moreover, I show that the moral identity of 
leaders plays a crucial moderating role in the relationship between the attributions 
that leaders make (i.e., a lack of integrity or a lack of competence of the follower) 
and how they respond to unethical followers (i.e., harshness of punishments). 
 
6.2 IMPLICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
 In this section, I will discuss both the major as well as some more specific 
contributions and implications of the empirical work presented in this dissertation.  
 I believe the major contribution of this dissertation is that I addressed the 
concerns that the majority of the literature on ethical leadership has (a) taken a 
prescriptive or normative approach, and (b) a receiver rather than an actor 
perspective. That is, the ethical leadership literature has informed us mainly on the 
type of leader behaviors that are effective and on what leader should do, say and 
act to stimulate ethical behavior in their organizations. In practice, however, as we 
have seen in numerous ethical scandals, leaders do not always engage in the most 
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effective and ethical behaviors. From this observation it becomes clear that it is 
also important to identify and examine those factors that affect the actions and 
decisions of leaders. The aim of the present dissertation was to provide a first step 
in doing so. 
I believe my approach in identifying and empirically examining potential 
antecedents and underlying motives of ethical leadership contributes to the rapidly 
growing research field of behavioral ethics (for recent overviews, see De Cremer, 
et al., 2010; De Cremer, et al., 2011; De Cremer & Tenbrunsel, 2011; De Cremer 
et al., forthcoming). Indeed, behavioral ethics researchers have highlighted the 
importance of studying what people and leaders actually do, why they do this and 
what factors affect their actions. Furthermore, although several scholars have 
called for more leadership research from an actor perspective rather than a 
receiver perspective (e.g., Bommer et al., 2004; Scott et al., 2009), actual studies 
that take such an actor perspective remain very rare in the literature.  
 Another important contribution of the present dissertation concerns the 
conceptualization of ethical leadership as having three important components. 
Ethical leadership has been defined as “the demonstration of normatively 
appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and 
the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way communication, 
reinforcement, and decision-making” (p. 120, Brown et al., 2005). Although this is 
one of the most quoted definitions of ethical leadership, and deservingly so, I 
argued that the broadness of the definition makes it rather difficult to examine 
ethical leadership as one holistic construct. Indeed, the topic of ethics (in general) 
and ethical leadership (specifically) often invite heated debates. In fact, I believe 
that most people that have attended an ethical leadership related conference can 
recall a discussion about what ethical leadership entails and similar discussions 
about what is ethical or not (e.g., see Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008).  
 In conceptualizing ethical leadership in a less abstract manner, I based 
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myself on the recent ethical leadership literature that discusses how ethical leaders 
actually provide ethical guidance and affect the ethical conduct of their followers 
(e.g., Trevino & Brown, 2005). Specifically, I operationalized ethical leadership as 
having three important aspects. First, ethical leaders are role models for positive 
behaviors, for instance by going beyond self-interest (i.e., self-sacrifice as 
discussed in Chapter 2). Second, ethical leaders act in accordance with important 
norms and values in the treatment of their employees (i.e., fairness enactment, as 
discussed in Chapter 3). Third, and finally, ethical leaders make use of reward 
systems and take pro-active actions when confronted with unethical behavior by 
their followers (i.e., take disciplinary actions, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 
respectively). Note that these three aspects fit well into Brown et al’s (2005) 
definition of ethical leadership. Indeed, the behaviors I examined in this 
dissertation all fall under normatively appropriate conduct or behaviors that 
promote such conduct to followers. To summarize, in this dissertation, I examined 
antecedents of ethical leadership by measuring specific leader behaviors (i.e., self-
sacrificing, being fair and punishing unethical behavior) rather than ethical 
leadership as one construct. Furthermore, all have their own theoretical and 
practical implications as discussed in more detail in the empirical chapters 2 
through 5.  
I believe that the findings in this dissertation show that ethical leadership 
research can benefit from such an operationalization. Above all, it makes ethical 
leadership a less abstract and more manageable construct to study. At the same 
time, it might also contribute to the use of available knowledge rather than 
unnecessary reinventing the wheel when studying or discussing ethical leadership. 
Indeed, the literature on related topics such as fairness, rewards and punishments 
as well as overlapping leadership styles (e.g., transformational leadership) 
provides many insights that are relevant in our scientific enterprise towards a 
better understanding of ethical leadership.  
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 The research I presented in this dissertation paint a mixed picture of 
leaders that is neither fully positive nor completely negative. Rather, they show 
that whether leaders act ethically or unethically depends on the interaction 
between their own motives and personality, the motives and actions of their 
followers and situational forces. For instance, Chapter 2 shows that when leaders 
feel excluded in their social collective, they are less inclined to act as a positive 
role model (e.g., self-sacrifice). But, this appears only to be the case for leaders 
who do not feel particularly powerful. In contrast, leaders who do feel powerful 
appear to be motivated to act as a role model regardless of whether they are liked, 
accepted and valued by their group. This finding might be counterintuitive for 
those who believe that feeling powerful corrupts people’s behavior as a rule of 
nature, but actually fits well into recent insights from the power literature that 
show that power can also have a positive effect on people’s actions. Indeed, recent 
literature on the subject has shown that power sometimes can make people act 
more in accordance with the goals of their organizational role (Overbeck & Park) 
and contribute more to the collective (Galinsky et al., 2003). 
 A second crucial aspect of ethical leadership that was examined in this 
dissertation was leader fairness enactment. Whereas in the literature it has been 
suggested that leaders might not always enact fairness (Brockner, 2006; Folger & 
Skarlicki, 1998), Chapter 3 paints a more positive picture of leaders. The findings 
in this chapter revealed that leaders adapt their procedural fairness enactment to 
the strength of followers’ control and belongingness needs, two motives that 
previous research has identified as explanatory factors of why people care so 
strongly about fairness. Our findings imply that leaders are aware of the 
importance of fairness in satisfying these followers’ needs. However, leaders 
appear to be especially motivated to serve followers’ control need by enacting fair 
procedures, when they feel that followers want to be a part of their organization 
(i.e., have a high need to belong).  
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 The final aspect of ethical leadership that I researched in Chapters 4 and 5 
is leaders’ disciplinary use against unethical followers. Chapter 4 provides a 
possible explanation why unethical behavior sometimes prevails in organizations 
even when leaders are held accountable for their actions. That is, I showed that 
when leaders personally benefit from unethical acts of their follower(s), self-
interested motives inhibit social pressures (i.e., accountability) to do the morally 
right thing (i.e., show disapproval). Additionally, I showed that followers 
accurately predict when leaders are less likely to show disapproval. This 
introduces the possibility, and further research is needed on this matter, that 
followers engage in unethical behavior in those instances that they are most likely 
to get away with it. This could create a negative vicious cycle of unethical 
behavior in the organization.   
Of course, unethical follower behavior might be the consequence of a 
deliberate action of the follower, but followers can also engage in unethical 
behavior accidently or because of a lack of competence. Integrity violations (i.e., 
intentional unethical behavior) are a bigger issue for organizations and should be 
dealt with explicitly, because a lack of integrity might lead to repeated unethical 
acts. In Chapter 5, I showed that only leaders with a high moral identity take 
harsher disciplinary actions against integrity violations than competence 
violations. In contrast, low moral identity leaders do not distinguish between 
competence and integrity violations. As an interesting aside, I also showed that 
making moral identity salient leads to a similar effect as measuring moral identity 
as a personality measure. This is intriguing from a practical point of view as it 
implies that organizations might be able to stimulate effective disciplinary actions 
among their leaders by reinforcing moral identity in their working environment 
(Aquino & Freeman, 2009; Aquino et al., 2009; Mayer et al., forthcoming).  
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6.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 The purpose of this dissertation was to examine when and why leaders 
engage in ethical behaviors. The present dissertation reveals many new insights on 
this issue. Nevertheless, many questions still need to be addressed in future 
research. The findings reported in this dissertation provide some interesting 
starting points as well as fruitful avenues for such future endeavors as discussed in 
the empirical Chapters 2 through 5.  
 One particularly intriguing question is whether ethical leader behaviors are 
driven by moral or more strategic and instrumental concerns. Are leaders ethical 
because they want to do the morally right thing? Or, do they act ethically, because 
it is in fact in their best interest to do so? In the literature, it has often been argued 
that level of moral reasoning and moral identity play an important role in 
explaining why people engage in ethical behavior (e.g., Aquino et al., 2009). 
However, for leaders, engaging in ethical behaviors such as self-sacrifice and 
procedural fairness can also yield positive outcomes, because through social 
exchange processes, it can lead to enhanced commitment, cooperativeness and 
performance of their followers. In such instances, engaging in ethical behaviors is 
not only moral, but also in the best interest of the leader, as it makes them more 
effective and successful as a leader.  
 Looking at the findings in this dissertation, there is evidence that for 
leaders both moral and self-interested concerns are important determinants of their 
decision to act in an ethical manner. In Chapter 4 for instance, we saw that self-
interested motives play a role in leader behavior and in fact can have a detrimental 
effect on leader’s decision to do the morally right thing (i.e., show disapproval of 
UFB), even when they can be called upon to justify their decision. At the same 
time, Chapter 5 reveals that moral identity also is an important determinant of 
leader’s disciplinary use against UFB. Indeed, leaders with a strong moral identity 
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punished integrity violations of their followers more strongly than competence 
violations. Low moral identity leaders did not make this distinction. It thus appears 
that both self-interested motives and moral motives play an important role in 
ethical leadership. Still, future research needs to examine more closely which 
motives underlies ethical leadership behaviors. 
 
6.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 In this dissertation, using different methods, in laboratory as well as 
organizational settings, empirical findings are presented on how leaders’ own 
motives and dispositions, the motives and actions of their followers as well as 
situational factors interactively predict when leaders engage in ethical or unethical 
leader behaviors. This approach was motivated by the hope that my work can 
contribute to and perhaps provide a starting point for a more behavioral and actor 
based study of ethical leadership. Ultimately, such an approach should contribute 
to a more balanced understanding of ethical leadership and insights on how to 
regulate ethical failures. 
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SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY) 
 
Gezien de hoeveelheid ethische schandalen in het bedrijfsleven is het niet 
verwonderlijk dat sociale wetenschappers in toenemende mate hun aandacht 
richten op ethisch leiderschap. Van leiddinggevenden wordt immers verwacht dat 
ze zelf ethisch handelen, maar ook dat ze ervoor zorgen dat hun werknemers dit 
doen. De literatuur over ethisch leiderschap heeft vooralsnog een sterk normatief 
karakter: de huidige literatuur geeft voornamelijk aan wat leiders zouden moeten 
doen. Helaas wijst de praktijk uit dat leidinggevenden niet altijd het juiste gedrag 
vertonen of de juiste morele keuzes maken. Dit maakt het belangrijk om meer 
inzicht te krijgen in wanneer en waarom leiders eigenlijk ethisch leiderschap 
vertonen. Deze meer descriptieve of zogenaamde gedragsethiek-benadering vormt 
het uitgangspunt van dit proefschrift.  
Ik richt me hierbij op drie belangrijke aspecten van ethisch leiderschap. 
Allereerst toon ik aan dat leiders eerder bereid zijn om zich als een rolmodel te 
gedragen (in de vorm van het maken van persoonlijke opofferingen voor hun 
groep, Hoofdstuk 2) wanneer ze het gevoel hebben dat ze behoren tot de groep 
waarover ze de leiding hebben. Dit effect wordt echter alleen gevonden voor 
leiders die zich niet machtig voelden. Daarnaast toon ik aan dat leiders belangrijke 
behoeftes van hun volgers meenemen in de (procedurele) rechtvaardigheid van 
beslissingen die betrekking hebben tot deze volgers, maar vooral wanneer deze 
behoeftes ook binnen de belangen van de organisatie passen (Hoofdstuk 3). 
Tenslotte richt ik me op de vraag hoe leiders omgaan met onethisch volgergedrag. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 vind ik dat wanneer leiders profiteren van onethisch volgergedrag 
ze dit eerder zullen toleren, zelfs wanneer de mogelijkheid bestaat dat ze 
verantwoording moeten afleggen voor hun acties en beslissingen. In Hoofdstuk 5 
vind ik dat niet alleen het gevolg, maar ook de oorzaak van onethisch 
volgergedrag een belangrijke voorspeller is van het strafgedrag van leiders. 
Leiders treden strenger op tegen onethisch gedrag dat veroorzaakt wordt door een 
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integriteitsschending (een bewuste daad) dan door een gebrek aan competentie, 
maar dit onderscheid wordt alleen gemaakt door leiders met een sterke morele 
identieit. 
Samengevat bieden mijn resultaten inzichten in hoe de motieven en 
disposities van leiders zelf, de motieven en acties van hun volgers, en 
omgevingsinvloeden een interactieve invloed hebben op het ethisch gedrag van 
leiders. Het is mijn hoop dat dit proefschrift een startpunt kan zijn voor een meer 
gedragsmatige benadering van ethisch leiderschapsonderzoek. Uiteindelijk zou dit 
moeten leiden tot een meer gebalanceerde kennis van ethisch leiderschap dat 
inzichten biedt in hoe ethiek beter gereguleerd kan worden in het bedrijfsleven. 
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SUMMARY  
 
Given the abundance of recent ethical scandals in business, it is not 
surprising that social scientists increasingly have turned their attention to ethical 
leadership. After all, leaders are expected to not only act ethically themselves, but 
also to promote such behavior among their employees. The current ethical 
leadership literature has taken a normative approach: it has focused mainly on 
what leaders should do. Unfortunately, in practice managers do not always display 
the right course of action. Therefore, it becomes important to also understand 
when and why leaders actually engage in ethical leadership behavior. This more 
descriptive or behavioral ethics approach is the starting point of this dissertation.  
In doing so, I focus on three important aspects of ethical leadership. First, 
I show that leaders are more willing to act as a role model (i.e., by making 
personal sacrifices for their group, Chapter 2) when they feel included in the group 
that they lead than when they feel excluded. However, this effect is only found for 
leaders who do not feel powerful. Second, I show that leaders take important needs 
of followers into account in the (procedural) fairness of their decisions relevant to 
these followers, especially when these needs are consistent with the interests of the 
organization (Chapter 3). Finally, I focus on how leaders deal with unethical 
followers. In Chapter 4, I show that when leaders personally benefit from unethical 
follower behavior, they will condone such behavior even when they can be held 
accountable for their actions. Additionally, in Chapter 5, I provide evidence that 
the cause of unethical follower behavior is an important predictor of the 
disciplinary actions of leaders. Leaders take harsher action against unethical 
behavior that was caused by an integrity violation (a deliberate act) than by a 
competence violation of the follower, but this distinction is only made by leaders 
with a strong moral identity. 
Taken together, my results show that the motives and dispositions of 
leaders themselves, the motives and actions of their followers and situational 
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influences interactively affect the ethical behavior of leaders. I hope that my 
research can act as a point of departure for a more behavioral approach to ethical 
leadership research. Ultimately this should lead to a more balanced understanding 
of ethical leadership that provides insights in how business ethics can be better 
regulated. 
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Given the abundance of ethical scandals in businesses, sports, governments and religious
organizations, it should come as no surprise that social scientists have increasingly put
ethical leadership on the forefront of their research agenda. However, the literature on
ethical leadership has primarily taken a normative approach, suggesting what leaders should
do. This approach does not help in explaining why leaders sometimes deviate from such
moral standards. In fact, little empirical work has been conducted on the question of when
or why leaders actually engage in (un)ethical behavior (a behavioral ethics approach). 
The research presented in this dissertation aims to take a first step in filling this gap in
the literature by identifying and examining antecedents of several ethical leader behaviors. I
aim to answer important empirical questions such as: When do leaders go beyond their self-
interest? When do leaders treat their followers in a fair manner? And, do leaders consist -
ently take action against unethical followers, or do they sometimes condone unethical
follower behavior? In answering such questions, I will show that aspects of leaders
themselves (motives and dispositions), aspects of their followers (motives and actions)
and aspects of the environment in which leaders operate interact in determining whether
leaders engage in ethical leader behaviors or not.
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onder -
zoek school) in the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding
participants of ERIM are the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus
School of Econo mics (ESE). ERIM was founded in 1999 and is officially accre dited by the
Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research under taken by
ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and interfirm
relations, and its busi ness processes in their interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage ment, and to offer an
ad vanced doctoral pro gramme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three
hundred senior researchers and PhD candidates are active in the different research pro -
grammes. From a variety of acade mic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM commu nity is
united in striving for excellence and working at the fore front of creating new business
knowledge.
Erasmus Research Institute of Management - 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM)
Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR)
P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, 
The Netherlands
Tel. +31 10 408 11 82
Fax +31 10 408 96 40
E-mail info@erim.eur.nl
Internet www.erim.eur.nl
B&T11413_ERIM_Omslag Hoogervorst_18juli11
